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9	Defendant SHAKEY'S PIZZA ASIA	donta		
10	VENTURES, INC. and Third Party Defendants CINCO CORPORATION, PC			
11	INTERNATIONAL PTE LTD., and SPA' INTERNATIONAL USA, INC.	VI		
12	,	DISTRICT COURT		
13	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
14	CENTRAL DISTRIC	CT OF CALIFORNIA		
15	SHAKEY'S PIZZA ASIA VENTURES, INC, a Philippines corporation,	Case No. 2:24-CV-04546-SB(AGRx)		
16	Plaintiff,	The Hon. Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr.		
17	,	, ,		
18	V.	JOINTLY FILED CLAIMS, COUNTERCLAIMS, THIRD		
19	PCJV USA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; PCI TRADING,	PARTY CLAIMS, AND		
20	LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; GUY KOREN, an individual;	AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO BE TRIED		
21	POTATO CORNER LA GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company;			
22	NKM CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company;			
23	J & K AMERICANA, LLC, a California limited liability company; J&K	Complaint Filed: May 31, 2024		
24	LAKEWOOD, LLC, a California limited liability company; J&K	Trial Date: August 18, 2025		
25	VALLEY FAIR, LLC, a California limited liability company; J & K			
26	ONTARIO, LLC, a California limited			
26	liability company; HLK MILPITAS,			
27	liability company; HLK MILPITAS, LLC, a California, limited liability company; GK CERRITOS, LLC, a			

1	limited liability company; and, GK CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, a California
2	limited liability company and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
3	Defendants.
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5	PCJV USA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; PCI TRADING LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; POTATO CORNER LA GROUP LLC,
6	a Delaware limited liability company; POTATO CORNER LA GROUP LLC.
7	l a California limited liability company:
8	GK CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company; NKM CAPITAL GROUP LLC, a
9	California limited liability company; and GUY KOREN, an individual,
10	Counter-Claimants,
11	V.
12	SHAKEY'S PIZZA ASIA VENTURES,
13	INC, a Philippines corporation,
14	Counter Defendant.
15	DOMINGA LLC - Delesses limited
16	PCJV USA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; PCI TRADING LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; POTATO CORNER LA GROUP LLC,
17	POTATO CORNER LA GROUP LLC,
18	a California limited liability company; GK CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, a
19	California limited liability company; NKM CAPITAL GROUP LLC, a
20	California limited liability company; and GUY KOREN, an individual,
21	Third Party Plaintiffs,
22	v.
23	PC INTERNATIONAL PTE LTD., a
24	Singapore business entity; SPAVI INTERNATIONAL USA, INC., a
25	California corporation; CINCO CORPORATION, a Philippines
26	corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
27	Third Party Defendants.
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Pursuant to Dkt. No. 254, the parties submit the following causes of action, counterclaims, third party claims, and affirmative defenses as at issue for trial. SPAVI further notes that two of its entries in this document are longer than one paragraph. With respect to those notes, given their rarity herein, and given the number of pleadings disputing those elements themselves, the disagreements abiu what can or cannot be presented therein have been extensive and cannot easily be consolidated into one paragraph while communicating the same layered issues. SPAVI apologizes to this Court and assures this Court it was not meant as a sign of disrespect, bit, rather a sign of the importance of those elements at issue.

- I. PLAINTIFF SHAKEY'S PIZZA ASIA VENTURE'S INC. ("SPAVI" OR "PLAINTIFF): CLAIMS TO BE TRIED BY A JURY.
- 1) Claim 1: Trademark Infringement Against All Entity Defendants
 (15 U.S.C. § 1114), regarding the three registered marks at issue: (1) U.S. Reg.
 No. 5900257: the word mark "Potato Corner" ("Word Mark"); (2) U.S. Reg. No. 6088456 protecting "World's Best Flavored French Fries (the "Slogan Mark"); and
 (3) U.S. Reg. No. 3760041 (the "Logo Mark") protecting:
 - a. <u>Element No. 1</u>: the Word Mark, Slogan Mark, and/or the Logo Mark (all collectively, the "Marks") are valid and protectible trademarks:
 - 1. This element is not disputed
 - b. <u>Element No. 2</u>: Plaintiff owns the Word Mark, Slogan Mark, and/or the Logo Mark
 - 1. This element is disputed.
 - 2. <u>Nature of Dispute:</u> Legal and Factual
 - 3. <u>Plaintiff's Legal Position:</u> Defendants do not dispute that the registrations for all three Marks (Trial Exhibit Nos. 1, 3, and 5) identify Cinco as the registrant and the first to use each of the three Marks, nor do Defendants dispute that the

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Deeds of Assignment attached to the notices filed with the USPTO (Trial Exhibit Nos. 4 and 6) confirm that, unequivocally and without exception, the entirety of these Marks were sold and assigned to Plaintiff, along with all the goodwill arising out of or associated with the Marks. Defendants also do not dispute the testimony of Seller (Cinco) and Buyer (SPAVI) that the Deeds are accurate in every way, that the sale and assignments were comprehensive, without outs, and fully carve Instead. **Defendants** consummated. take internally inconsistent positions that are contradicted by various legal doctrine, including: (1) Licensee Estoppel, wherein PCJV (as well as all other Defendants that operate or own a business using the Marks), as a licensee of Cinco (and subsequently SPAVI) through the implied license or even the unsigned Master License Agreement claimed by Defendants to be binding "may not set up any adverse claim in it as against its licensor." Pac. Supply Co-op. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch. Inc., 318 F.2d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 1963). (2) The Lanham Act provisions rendering Defendants' positions contrary to federal law, in that Defendants' attempts to claim that the first time they used the Marks should be credited to them, even though they were acting as licensees of PCJV or Defendants' claim of ownership of the goodwill created through PCJV's stores (operated as licensees) inured to Defendants' benefit contradicts 15 USC § 1055 (as well as the unsigned Master License Agreement they claimed to be adhering to this

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whole time). (3) Law of the case, in that Defendants' challenge to Plaintiff's ownership of the Marks based on Defendants' first use as licensee of Cinco has already been resolved by this Court and the Ninth Circuit, which held that "it is undisputed that Cinco registered the three marks at issue then transferred ownership of those marks to SPAVI." The Ninth Circuit then explicitly rejected PCJV's theories that it was the first to use the marks domestically by holding that "in the licensor-licensee context, a licensee's use of a trademark inures to the benefit of the licensor-registrant" (Shakeys Pizza Asia Ventures, Inc. v. PCJV USA, LLC, No. 24-7084, 2025 WL 1431270, at *1 (9th Cir. May 19, 2025)), thus rendering, for example, any allegation by PCJV of its use as a licensee as being proof of its first use cannot serve as a basis to challenge SPAVI's ownership because this theory has been considered and rejected by the Ninth Circuit in this case, as has also the various other legal theories of Defendants offered during the injunction stage that are based on the same facts asserted during the injunction and rejected by this Court. Even at the injunction stage, rulings by this Court and the Ninth Circuit "on pure issues of law, however, are binding." Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S. Dep't of Agr., 499 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007); see, e.g. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) (citing the rule as being "when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same

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case"). (4) Authorities cited by Defendants do not support their position, including Sengoku, which presented a distinguishable case – a foreign manufacturer that was the first to use versus the domestic distributor that was the registrant, whereas in this case the foreign licensor is both the first to use and the registrant – and yet, Defendants continue to cite it as supporting their claim of ownership or rights, and it does not. (5) The merger doctrine, wherein the purchase and sale agreement between Cinco and SPAVI selling and agreeing to assign to SPAVI the Potato Corner marks and brand merge into the undisputed and unequivocal deeds that are notarized and ratified by Buyer and Seller (Trial Exhibit Nos. 4 and 6) such that these Deeds would control if there was any inconsistency between the purchase and sale agreement and the deed (there is not, as those agreements said nothing about and acknowledged no rights held by any of the Defendants), such that Defendants' speculative theory that the purchase and sale agreement between Cinco and SPAVI reserved some rights for Defendants cannot even be presented to the jury given that the Deeds do not reserve anything for Defendants – a doctrine that applies in federal intellectual property cases and renders any questions as to what the deal between SPAVI and Cinco actually said, irrelevant. See, e.g., Palos Verdes Corp. v. Hous. Auth. of Los Angeles Cnty., 202 Cal. App. 2d 827, 836 (1962) (explaining that "if the language of a deed is plain, certain, and unambiguous, neither parol evidence nor surrounding

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facts and circumstances will be considered to add to, detract from, or vary its terms or to determine the estate conveyed); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. A. T. I. Caribe, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 464,467 (D. Del. 1973) (applying this concept in the intellectual property context). (6) Standing, in that none of the Defendants were party to the transaction between Cinco and Plaintiff, and as such, have no standing to question whether the Deeds (notarized and ratified) represent the actual deal between Cinco and SPAVI or some other imagined reservation of their rights supposedly contained in the purchase and sale agreement that did not make it into the Deeds (a fantasy that did not happen). See, e.g. Imperial Residential Design, Inc. v. Palms Dev. Grp., Inc., 70 F.3d 96, 99 (11th Cir. 1995) (agreeing that "that, where there is no dispute between the copyright owner and the transferee about the status of the copyright, it would be unusual and unwarranted to permit a third-party infringer to invoke [the requirement of a writing memorializing the status] to avoid suit for copyright infringement."). (7) Judicial estoppel, in his sworn allegations in the Prior Governance Action (Cinco Corporation et. al. v. Guy Koren et. al. Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC701075), Koren admitted repeatedly including in verified allegations that Cinco "owned the Potato Corner brand" (Trial Exhibit No. 1421, ¶ 26), an allegation that Cinco *admitted* (Trial Exhibit, No. 1422, ¶ 26.), such that PCJV and Koren must be barred from making a "factual assertion" that Cinco did not own the brand "which

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directly contradicts an earlier assertion made in the same proceeding or a prior one." United States v. Lence, 466 F.3d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing and quoting Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir.1990)).

Defendants' Position Statement: The ownership issues 4. framed by the Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order (Dkt. No. 244), the Memoranda of Contentions of Law and Fact (Dkt. Nos. 197 and 199) and pleadings are: (1) senior use under Sengoku, including actual first use (restructure in 2009) and lawful first use, see CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Services, Inc., 474 F3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); (2) continuous use under 15 U.S.C § 1055; (3) assignment in gross; (4) acquisition of "attached" rights by the PCJV USA Parties and Plaintiff's corresponding denial of acquiring burdens attached to the trademarks; (5) naked license; and (6) priority favoring Defendants based on other defenses. Plaintiff's proffered statement is nonresponsive. It is a combative, inappropriate and false narrative of Defendants' position, record evidence, preliminary rulings and the ownership issues for trail as set forth in the Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order (Dkt. No. 244), Memorandums of Contentions of Law and Fact (Dkt. Nos. 197 and 199) and pleadings. "The court's preliminary injunction did not make final factual determinations; no party moved for summary judgment; and the jury needs to be instructed on the claims asserted in this case." Dkt. No. 254 at 2. Plaintiff's unpled defenses of infringer standing, licensee estoppel, judicial estoppel,

and merger (parol evidence) doctrine are not issues for trial per the Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order (Dkt. No. 244) or Plaintiff's Memorandum of Contentions of Law and Fact (Dkt. No. 199). Plaintiff's asserted "legal positions," which seek to avoid a trial on the merits, are also based on inapplicable authority (or no authority at all) and misstate the record. For these reasons, including because Plaintiff's "legal positions" go beyond identifying the actual ownership issues set for trial, Defendants will address them if or when they arise after the evidence on ownership is presented at trial

- 5. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO filings including Registrations and Assignments, testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), FDDs, Franchise Agreements.
- 6. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> documents and testimony including and related to (1) Defendants' senior use and quality control of Potato Corner in the United States; (2) the superseding partnership agreement; (3) DLA Piper's notification of Cinco Corporation's unlawful use of Potato Corner in the United States; (4) the State of California's Department of Business Oversight's Order sanctioning PCJV USA, LLC for Cinco Corporation's alleged prior use of Potato Corner in the United States; (5) the superseding and restructure agreement confirmed by Guy Koren and Jose Magsaysay vesting ownership of Potato Corner in their partnership; (6) the joint venture

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agreement vesting co-ownership of Potato Corner in the United States in PCJV USA, LLC; (7) control over Potato Corner in the United States being vested with and exercised by PCJV USA, LLC; (8) Potato Corner USA being affixed to Potato Corner in the United States; (9) consumer association of Potato Corner in the United States with PCJV USA, LLC, to whom complaints, if any, were lodged; (10) PCJV USA, LLC's creation, development and hold over the goodwill of Potato Corner in the United States for over a decade; (11) absent a license agreement, which SPAVI Parties disavow, PCJV USA, LLC's use inured to its own benefit; (12) Cinco Corporation's lack of control of Potato Corner in the United States for over a decade; (13) Defendants' objection to Plaintiff's alleged acquisition of U.S. trademark rights in breach of Cinco Corporation's fiduciary duties and PCJV USA, LLC's joint venture agreement ("JVA") and First Amendment thereto ("First Amendment") given that Plaintiff was disavowing the existence of a license agreement; (14) Cinco Corporation assigned U.S. Potato Corner trademarks to Plaintiff without the goodwill associated with the trademarks; (15) Plaintiff's lack of control of Potato Corner in the United States after it allegedly acquired the U.S. trademarks; (16) Defendants' Membership Interest Purchase Agreement ("MIPA") with Cinco acquiring all of its Interests in PCJV USA, LLC and all rights "attached" thereto unencumbered by a need for a license from any third party; (17) Plaintiff's denial of stepping into Cinco

Corporation's shoes and acquiring the licensing burdens attached to the U.S. trademarks; and (18) Plaintiff's suppression of ownership evidence.

- c. <u>Element No. 3</u>: Defendants used the Word Mark, Slogan Mark, and/or the Logo Mark in interstate commerce after May 31, 2024:
 - 1. This element is undisputed.
- d. <u>Element No. 4</u>: Defendants' use of the Word Mark, Slogan Mark, and/or the Logo Mark in interstate commerce after May 31, 2024, was without the consent of Plaintiff and in a manner likely to cause confusion among ordinary consumers as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or approval of the services.
 - 1. This element is disputed.
 - 2. <u>Nature of Dispute</u>: Legal and Factual
 - 3. <u>Plaintiff's Legal Position</u>: As for absence of consent, given the absence of any ownership rights, Defendants must locate some right as a licensee of the owner (SPAVI). Defendants offer two documents proffered as agreements that bind Cinco to a perpetual license. Neither work as a matter of law. First, they offer the unsigned October 10, 2010, document containing terms for a Master License Agreement (Trial Exhibit No. 11), which this Court (and the Ninth Circuit) have reviewed. Both have interpreted it as a matter of law, concluding that it is an unsigned draft (as Koren's testimony has confirmed) and illusory because the licensor is given no consideration for this purported agreement. The unsigned document cannot, as a matter of law, have bound Cinco, even through implied contract law, because Cinco did not do anything in furtherance of that

document to imply its assent. Moreover, multiple times after October 10, 2010, documents were signed stating that Cinco would be expecting a 30% royalty recovery. Second, Plaintiffs point to § 3(g) of an Amended Joint Venture Agreement (and its predecessor the Joint Venture Agreement) – Trial Exhibit Nos. 8 and 9 – which this Court has already interpreted to constitute an agreement to agree, in the future, with Cinco on a license agreement. As the Ninth Circuit said in affirming this conclusion, "the AJVA contained an agreement to enter a future Master License Agreement, not a "perpetual license" like PCJV claims." Shakeys Pizza Asia Ventures, Inc. v. PCJV USA, LLC, No. 24-7084, 2025 WL 1431270, at *1 (9th Cir. May 19, 2025) (citing First Nat'l Mortg. Co. v. Fed. Realty Inv. Tr., 631 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[A]n 'agreement to agree,' without more, is not a binding contract."). This interpretation of the AJVA and JVA is a legal conclusion, which, as affirmed by the Ninth Circuit are legal conclusions, and, as such, these are pure conclusions of law, which means: this Court's conclusion that § 3(g) of the JVA and AJVA are agreements to agree and do not bind Cinco to a "perpetual license" are law of the case and cannot be disturbed or challenged at trial. This theory based on interpretation of a contract has been considered and rejected by this Court and the Ninth Circuit in this case, and because it is a "pure issue[] of law, however, [it is] binding" on Defendants under law of the case. Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United

Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S. Dep't of Agr., 499 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007); see, e.g. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) ((citing the rule as being "when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case"). Defendants now trot out other theories such the fact that the JVA and prior Operating Agreement are still somewhat live under a theory of partial integration, however, the following point prevails over each of these contortions: Defendants can point to no agreement or or acct, or statement, binding Cinco to a perpetual, irrevocable, royalty free licensee of its Marks. As such, in the absence of any written agreement, or documentation of any license terms, the sole license that existed as of May 31, 2024, was implied and terminable at will See Pogrebnoy v. Russian Newspaper Distribution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd, 742 F. App'x 291 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[A]n implied license, like any other contract, is terminable at the will of either party if it is not for a specified term."). One final flaw exists in the attempt to bind Cinco to the AJVA, and that is one of issue preclusion in favor of Plaintiffs. As evidenced by Plaintiff's own Third Amended Complaint (verified) in the Prior Governance Action, the entire pleading is based on the theory that -- and it sought judgment concluding that -- Cinco is an alter ego of the entity that was a 60% member of PCJV. (See Trial Exhibit No. 1421 p. 7:3-14.) Such allegations, having been dismissed, with prejudice, by

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Koren, re4nder thee accusations extinguished, and, as such, Defendants are precluded from alleging them ever again.

Regarding likelihood of confusion, which may be resumed, and the jury may be so instructed "[w]here,' as here, "a licensee persists in the unauthorized use of a licensor's trademark, courts have found that the continued use alone establishes a likelihood of consumer confusion." *Robert Trent Jones II, Inc. v. GFSI, Inc.*, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing and quoting *Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft Corp.*, 999 F.Supp. 1301, 1311 (N.D.Cal.1998) (citing *Paisa, Inc. v. N & G Auto, Inc.*, 928 F.Supp. 1009, 1012 n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1996); *Hollywood Athletic Club*, 938 F.Supp. at 614–15 (C.D.Cal.1996)). The Sixth Circuit's analysis in Max Rack, Inc. v. Core Health & Fitness, LLC, 40 F.4th 454, 464 (6th Cir. 2022) is instructive:

"A separate body of law has developed for this distinct claim that a holdover licensee has continued to use a licensor's mark after their agreement expired. See 4 McCarthy, supra, § 25:31 (citing cases). In this context, courts have iettisoned totality-of-thethe usual circumstances test in favor of a more categorical rule: "proof of continued, unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish 'likelihood of confusion.'" U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1190 (6th Cir. 1997); ITT Indus., Inc. v. Wastecorp. *Inc.*, 87 F. App'x 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2004); Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA,

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Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1989); *Burger* King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1492–93 (11th Cir. 1983); Pro. Golfers Ass'n of Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1975); L & L Wings, Inc. v. Marco-Destin, *Inc.*, 676 F. Supp. 2d 179, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). This rule makes good sense when a holdover licensee blatantly infringes the licensor's mark by using that mark in the same way as it did before the agreement expired. Without any need to tick through factors, it should be obvious that consumers will believe, for example, that a pizza restaurant remains affiliated with the "Little Caesars" chain when a terminated franchisee continues to operate the pizzeria as a Little Caesars. See Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Miramar Quick Serv. Rest. Corp., 2020 WL 4516289, at *3 (6th Cir. 2020) (order)"

Although Plaintiff intends to, and will, adduce proof of the *Sleekcraft* factors, the presumption exists, and it is entitled to stand on this presumption alone. *See also, Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. Corp.*, 174 F.3d 1036, 1056 (9th Cir. 1999) ("In light of the virtual identity of marks, if they were used with identical products or services likelihood of confusion would follow as a matter of course"); *Park 'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.*, 782 F.2d 1508, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that when marks and services are identical and channels are the same, likelihood of confusion is assumed, even if the other factors weight against); *see also Blue Mako Inc. v. Minidis*, No. CV 07-916 AHM (SHX), 2008 WL 11334205 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2008) (applying these principles to similar facts). Although Plaintiff intends to, and will, adduce proof of the *Sleekcraft* factors, the presumption exists, and it is entitled to stand on this

presumption alone.

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4. Defendants' Position Statement: If Defendants are not found to have a superior claim to ownership, authorization issues framed by the Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order (Dkt. No. 244), the Memoranda of Contentions of Law and Fact (Dkt. Nos. 197 and 199) and pleadings are whether, based on a partnership meeting of the minds, governing documents, course of performance, fiduciary and contractual obligations, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and reasonable and detrimental reliance: (1) PCJV USA, LLC had a "lifetime" license as a joint venture partner; (2) PCJV USA, LLC had a 20-year license with three 10-year options; (3) PCJV USA, LLC had a non-terminable-at-will license; (4) Plaintiff owed fiduciary or contractual obligations to provide PCJV USA, LLC a long-term license consistent with the PCJV USA Parties being joint venture partners, see J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 18:15, at (5th ed.) ("It is elementary ancient law that an assignee never stands in any better position than his assignor") (citation omitted); and (5) other defenses to enforcement, including promissory estoppel, authorizing PCJV USA, LLC's continued use of the U.S. trademarks. Plaintiff's proffered statement is nonresponsive. It is a combative, inappropriate and false narrative of record evidence, preliminary rulings and the authorization issues for trail as set forth in the Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order (Dkt. No. 244),

Memoranda of Contentions of Law and Fact (Dkt. Nos. 197 and 199) and pleadings. "The court's preliminary injunction did not make final factual determinations; no party moved for summary judgment; and the jury needs to be instructed on the claims asserted in this case." Dkt. No. 254 at 2. Plaintiff's asserted "legal positions," which seek to avoid a trial on the merits, are also based on inapplicable authority (or no authority at all) and misstate the record. For these reasons, including because Plaintiff's "legal positions" go beyond identifying the actual authorization issues set for trial, Defendants will address them if or when they arise after the evidence on PCJV USA LLC's authorization to continue using the U.S. trademarks is presented at trial.

- 5. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Trial Exhibit 29 (May 31, 2024 Termination); photographs of various stores taken from May 31, 2025 through the present; Testimony of Koren; Plaintiff executives Gregorio (Plaiuntiff's CEO), Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO charged with US operations), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising); investigator; Franchisees; Kim Lambert and Barry Kurtz; in addition to the following documents Amended Joint Venture Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement.
- Defendants' Supporting Evidence: 6. documents testimony including and related to (1) Defendants' senior use and quality control of Potato Corner in the United States; (2) the superseding and restructure agreement confirmed by Guy Koren and Jose Magsaysay vesting

partnership rights to build, develop and control Potato Corner in the United States; (3) the joint venture agreement vesting lifetime partnership rights to build, develop and control Potato Corner in the United States; (4) absent a license agreement, which SPAVI Parties disavow, PCJV USA, LLC's owns the U.S. Potato Corner marks as its use inured to its own benefit; (5) all the terms and conditions of the JVA and First Amendment thereto controlling licensing, approval of franchisee agreements, including as disclosed in franchise disclosure documents ("FDDs"), and management and operations of Potato Corner in the United States; (6) parol evidence regarding the partners' meeting of the minds; (7) the JVA's related agreements, which remained operative and under which Cinco Corporation remained a fiduciary and party to the JVA after the First Amendment as confirmed a plethora of documentary evidence; (8) the license agreements setting forth the terms and conditions upon which PCJV USA, LLC's senior use and control of Potato Corner in the United States would inure to the benefit of Cinco Corporation, which the SPAVI Parties now disavow, even though Cinco Corporation offered it through DLA Piper, or thereafter accepted, countersigned or otherwise entered into the license agreements as evidenced in many writings and agreed and approved of in FDDs; (9) course of performance for more than a decade as evidenced by approved FDDs, which ratified the license agreements and confirmed an entered into license agreement; (10) reasonable and detrimental

2) Claim 3: False Designation of Origin and Description of Fact Against All Entity Defendants (15 U.S.C. § 1125):

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- a. <u>Element No. 1</u>: The Defendants used a designation, such as a word, term, name, device, or a combination thereof, or a false designation of origin:
 - 1. This element is disputed.
 - 2. <u>Nature of Dispute:</u> Legal and Factual
 - <u>Plaintiff's Position Statement</u>: This is essentially the 3. federal version of our § 17200 claim in that, when looked at in its entirety, fits squarely within what was intended by 15 USDCD 1125(a)(1)(A). By continuing to operate using the same federal trademarks, menu layouts, and color schemes, and promotes its new brand as having the 'same taste' after having reverse engineered the flavorings and then used that, plus the menu that is unchanged – same colors, fonts, pictures, layout, even same product names – and all of this is likely to cause consumer confusion regarding the source or origin of the goods or services, as customers may believe the new business is still affiliated with or originates from the original brand. See generally Blue Mako Inc. v. Minidis, No. CV 07-916 AHM (SHX), 2008 WL 11334205 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2008) (applying these principles to similar facts).
 - 4. <u>Defendants' Position Statement:</u> The legal issues set for trial in the Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order (Dkt. No. 244), Memoranda of Contentions of Law and Fact (Dkt. Nos. 197 and 199) and pleadings regard ownership of and authorization to use the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks; there is no "trade dress" issue in the pleadings set for trial. Moreover, "same as" comparative advertising

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of taste or fragrance is not unfair competition. *Smith v. Chanel*, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1968). Further, proffered "former location" confusion is not actionable in California (*see* Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600) nor proves or is probative of ordinary consumer confusion that is the subject of the Lanham Act after the market settles from a partnership divorce, especially after Plaintiff is the one who changed the *status quo* and caused any confusion

- 5. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Photographs and testimony from former franchisees, the COO of SPAVI, Mr. Concepcion, as well as the testimony of Koren, and the Franchise Agreements, FDDs, and leases, of PCJV over the years.
- 6. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: documents testimony including and related to (1) Defendants' ownership of the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks, which merely are a symbol of PCJV USA, LLC's business and restaurant and catering services; (2) Defendants' authorization to use the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks; (3) no consumer survey evidence; (4) no evidence of ordinary consumer confusion but just actionable speculation about market conditions after the market stabilizes, let alone actionable confusion attributable to alleged unfair competition framed by the Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order (Dkt. No. 244), Memoranda of Contentions of Law and Fact (Dkt. Nos. 197 and 199) and pleadings; (5) no marketplace confusion before Plaintiff brought this action; (6) any marketplace confusion would

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stem from Plaintiff's efforts to create it rather than Plaintiff just filing an action for declaratory relief to resolve ownership and authorization issues after it acquired contested assets in the middle of franchise litigation between joint venture partners; and (7) Plaintiff's suppression of evidence, including Plaintiff's communications with U.S. franchisees under contract with PCJV USA, LLC that were timely requested and ordered be produced.

- b. <u>Element No. 2</u>: The use was in interstate commerce.
 - i. This element is not disputed
- c. <u>Element No. 3</u>: The use was in connection with goods or services.
 - 1. This element is disputed.
 - 2. <u>Nature of Dispute:</u> Legal and Factual
 - 3. <u>Plaintiff's Position Statement:</u> Defendants' purported objection is one of fact no law. The registrations are for services, and the use of the marks was for services. If Defendants were using the Marks for some other purpose, they have more liability than previously known.
 - 4. <u>Defendants' Position Statement:</u> The registered first use of the registered marks are for restaurant and catering services; the registered marks are merely a symbol of Potato Corner in the United States, which distributed goods and services; the case is not a "goods" case, including because the registrations predate any alleged unfair competition.
 - Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: USPTO filings including Registrations and Assignments.

- 6. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> documents and testimony including and related to (1) U.S. Reg. No. 5900257: the word mark "Potato Corner"; (2) U.S. Reg. No. 6088456: "World's Best Flavored French Fries; and (3) U.S. Reg. No. 3760041: the Logo Mark.
- d. <u>Element No. 4</u>: Defendants' designation or false designation is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception regarding either the affiliation, connection, or association of the defendant with another person, or the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the defendant's goods, services, or commercial activities by another person.
 - 1. This element is disputed in part.
 - 2. <u>Nature of Dispute:</u> Legal and Factual
 - Plaintiff's Legal Position: The ultimate test" for unfair 3. competition is exactly the same as for trademark infringement: "whether the public is likely to be deceived or confused." Century 21 Real Est. Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 1988)Regarding likelihood of confusion, which may be presumed, and the4 jury may be so instructed "[w]here,' as here, "a licensee persists in the unauthorized use of a licensor's trademark, courts have found that the continued use alone establishes a likelihood of consumer confusion." Robert Trent Jones II, Inc. v. GFSI, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing and quoting Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft Corp., 999 F.Supp. 1301, 1311 (N.D.Cal.1998) (citing *Paisa, Inc.* v. N & G Auto, Inc., 928 F.Supp. 1009, 1012 n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1996); Hollywood Athletic Club, 938 F.Supp. at

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Case	2:24-cv-04546-SB-AGR Document 258 Filed 08/12/25 Page 25 of 164 Page ID #:10786
1	614–15 (C.D.Cal.1996)). The Sixth Circuit's analysis in
2	Max Rack, Inc. v. Core Health & Fitness, LLC, 40 F.4th
3	454, 464 (6th Cir. 2022) is instructive:
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	"A separate body of law has developed for this distinct claim that a holdover licensee has
5	continued to use a licensor's mark after their
6	agreement expired. See 4 McCarthy, supra, §
7	25:31 (citing cases). In this context, courts have jettisoned the usual totality-of-the-
8	circumstances test in favor of a more categorical
9	rule: "proof of continued, unauthorized use of an
10	original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient
11	to establish 'likelihood of confusion.' " U.S.
	Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d
12	1185, 1190 (6th Cir. 1997); <i>ITT Indus., Inc. v. Wastecorp. Inc.</i> , 87 F. App'x 287, 293 (3d Cir.
13	2004); Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-
14	USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1989);
15	Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480,
16	1492–93 (11th Cir. 1983); Pro. Golfers Ass'n of Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665,
17	670 (5th Cir. 1975); L & L Wings, Inc. v. Marco-
18	Destin, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 179, 188 (S.D.N.Y.
	2009). This rule makes good sense when a holdover licensee blatantly infringes the
19	licensor's mark by using that mark in the same
20	way as it did before the agreement expired.
21	Without any need to tick through factors, it should be obvious that consumers will believe,
22	for example, that a pizza restaurant remains
23	affiliated with the "Little Caesars" chain when a
24	terminated franchisee continues to operate the
25	pizzeria as a Little Caesars. See Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Miramar Quick Serv. Rest. Corp.,
	2020 WL 4516289, at *3 (6th Cir. 2020) (order)"
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27	Although Plaintiff intends to, and will, adduce proof of the
28	Sleekcraft factors, the presumption exists, and it is entitled to
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stand on this presumption alone. See also, Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1056 (9th Cir. 1999) ("In light of the virtual identity of marks, if they were used with identical products or services likelihood of confusion would follow as a matter of course"); Park 'n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 782 F.2d 1508, 1509 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that when marks and services are identical and channels are the same, likelihood of confusion is assumed, even if the other factors weight against); see also Blue Mako Inc. v. Minidis, No. CV 07-916 AHM (SHX), 2008 WL 11334205 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2008) (applying these principles to similar facts).

4. Defendants' Position Statement: Defendants are not going to argue no likelihood of confusion arising from continuous use of registered and unregistered trademarks if Defendants do not prevail on ownership or authorization. However, this is not a "trade dress" case. The legal issues set for trial in the Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order (Dkt. No. 244), Memoranda of Contentions of Law and Fact (Dkt. Nos. 197 and 199) and pleadings regard ownership of and authorization to use the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks; there is no "trade dress" issue in the pleadings set for trial. Moreover, "same as" comparative advertising of taste or fragrance is not unfair competition. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1968). Further, proffered "former location" confusion is not actionable in California (see Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600) nor proves or is probative of ordinary consumer confusion that is the subject of the Lanham Act after the

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market settles from a partnership divorce, especially after Plaintiff is the one who changed the status quo and caused any confusion.

- 5. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Trial Exhibit 29 (May 31, 2024 Termination); photographs of various stores taken from May 31, 2025 through the present; Testimony of Koren; Plaintiff executives Gregorio (Plaiuntiff's CEO), Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO charged with US operations), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising); investigator; Franchisees; Kim Lambert and Barry Kurtz; in addition to the following documents Amended Joint Venture Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement; the COO of SPAVI, Mr. Concepcion, the Franchise Agreements, FDDs, and leases, of PCJV over the years.
- 6. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: documents testimony including and related to (1) Defendants' ownership of the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks, which merely are a symbol of PCJV USA, LLC's business and and catering services; (2) Defendants' restaurant authorization to use the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks; (3) no consumer survey evidence; (4) no evidence of actionable ordinary consumer confusion but just speculation about market conditions after the market stabilizes, let alone actionable confusion attributable to alleged unfair competition framed by the Proposed Final Pretrial Conference Order (Dkt. No. 244), Memoranda of Contentions of Law and Fact (Dkt. Nos. 197 and 199) and pleadings; (5) no marketplace confusion before Plaintiff

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brought this action; (6) any marketplace confusion would stem from Plaintiff's efforts to create it rather than Plaintiff just filing an action for declaratory relief to resolve ownership and authorization issues after it acquired contested assets in the middle of franchise litigation between joint venture partners; and (7) Plaintiff's suppression of evidence, including Plaintiff's communications with U.S. franchisees under contract with PCJV USA, LLC that were timely requested and ordered be produced

- e. <u>Element No. 5:</u> Damage caused by false designation.
 - 1. This element is disputed.
 - 2. <u>Nature of Dispute</u>: Legal and factual
 - 3. <u>Plaintiff's Legal Position:</u> The standard to be followed is set forth in 15 USC § 1117 which only requires this Court's approval in equity to proceed with money damages. The Courts have, contrary to Defendant's apparent position, removed the requirement of willfulness to obtain disgorgement., Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 1492, 1495-97, 206 L.Ed.2d 672 (2020) (holding willfulness is not a precondition to disgorgement of profits under the Lanham Act). (Dkt. No. 594.) Defendants ignore the difference between normal infringement and this case, the holdover licensee, where the standard for likelihood of confusion is lowered, and even sometimes presumed, and irreparable harm is also presumed. The Lanham Act allows Defendants to raise the other arguments to rebut the presumption of irreparable

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harm, but the standard as applied here allows for disgorgement.

4. Defendants' Position Statement: Likelihood of confusion, when coupled with likely irreparable harm, is the standard for injunctive relief, the primary remedy under the Lanham Act (National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry v. Cal. State Grange, 182 F.Supp. 3d 1065, 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2016)), the benefits of which Plaintiff has already obtained in this case by flipping franchisees under contract with Defendants to join its organization notwithstanding PCJV USA, LLC's rebranding rights and obligations disclosed in FDDs; Plaintiff fails to acknowledge its legal and higher burden of proof to establish an entitlement to monetary recovery, whether legal damages (which Plaintiff is not pursuing as there is no evidence it has a legal right to conduct a franchise business in California or elsewhere in the United States) or disgorgement—both of which stem from actual confusion in the market not attributable to Plaintiff's own conduct as proof of a defendant actually trading on the goodwill of another resulting in either lost profits or unjust enrichment (Gracie v. Gracie, 217 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000)); in addition to there being no consumer survey evidence or probative evidence of actual confusion not attributable to Plaintiff's own conduct (let alone attributable to trademark infringement), Defendants' exercise of bona fide good faith belief not to waive (a) pre-existing partnership (whether ownership or authorization) rights and obligations to use

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and control the U.S. trademarks and to equally receive service fees if any royalties were paid to the registrant when (b) Plaintiff allegedly acquired U.S. Potato Corner trademarks in the middle of franchise litigation between joint venture partners, (c) over Defendants' objection, (d) initiating this lawsuit in a conspiracy 3 days after the settlement with Plaintiff's assignor to circumvent a state court injunction rather than go to trial in state court, (e) disregarding a tolling agreement to continue discussions and not filing an action for declaratory relief if there was an impasse to determine who has superior trademark rights, (f) creating the risk of marketplace confusion by virtue of its own conduct; and (e) suppressing evidence, including properly served discovery ordered to be produced, does not satisfy Plaintiff's legal burden of proof. See Yuga Labs, *Inc. v. Ripps*, Case No. CV 22-4355-JFW(JEMx), 2023 WL 7089922, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2023) (while totality of the circumstances are used to determine an award of profits, "defendant's mental state is 'a highly important consideration ").

5. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Defendants produced financials for the period in question May 31, 2024 through the present, and, given that the entirety off their business is built off the confusion, we only need to prove profits which can be disgorged. Thus, the financials as well as Koren testimony and testimony of franchisees as well; as correspondence regarding costs of goods sold as well as the testimony of the CFO of Shakley's will

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the contrary, it is Defendant who bears a heavier burden of establishing what costs or expenses "actually contributed to the sale of the infringing products." *Monster Energy Co. v. Integrated Supply Network, LLC*, 533 F. Supp. 3d 928, 938 (C.D. Cal. 2021)

Defendant's Supporting Evidence: documents and

establish damage. No expert is needed for arithmetic. To

6. Defendant's Supporting Evidence: documents and testimony including and related to (1) the parties' meeting of the minds and partnership agreement to co-own Potato Corner in the United States, where Defendants promised to contribute services and Plaintiff promised to vest IP rights in the partnership as supported by written agreements and verified pleadings; (2) the JVA and related agreements vesting licensing and quality control in PCJV USA, LLC's President, approval of franchise agreements, including as disclosed in FDDs, in PCJV USA, LLC's Management, and authority to manage Potato Corner in the United States in PCJV USA, LLC's executive officers (not Cinco Corporation); (3) absent a license agreement, PCJV USA, LLC's use of the U.S. Potato Corner marks inured to PCJV USA, LLC's benefit; (4) Defendants' continuing authorization to use the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks under a lifetime, 50-year, or non-terminable-at-will license, including for the reasons stated herein; (5) Defendants' objection to Plaintiff's announced plans to acquire Cinco Corporation's assets and liabilities, but representations to Defendants that they would be bound by a settlement with Cinco resolving licensing issues; (6) the

parties' tolling agreement, including to continue discussions after Defendants separately settled with Cinco Corporation; (7) Plaintiff and Cinco Corporation's bad faith conspiracy to initiate this lawsuit 3 days after the settlement with Plaintiff's assignor to circumvent a state court injunction rather than go to trial in state court or settle with Defendants; (8) Plaintiff's own misconduct creating the risk of marketplace confusion; (9) no consumer survey evidence or evidence of marketplace confusion attributable to trademark infringement or unfair competition that is the subject of this case; (10) Plaintiff's suppression of evidence, including properly served discovery ordered to be produced; (11) no evidence of unjust enrichment, including no net profits or net profits attributable to the alleged infringement at issue, to disgorge; and (12) no evidence regarding individual Defendants' responsibility

Claim 4: Contributory Trademark Infringement Against All 3) Defendants (Against Guy Koren, PCJV USA, LL, PCI Trading, LLC, Potato Corner LA Group, LLC; GK Capital, LLC or NKM Capital Group, LLC)

- Element No. 1: inducement of any Defendant to infringe one of a. the Marks (affirmative steps or actions taken to encourage infringement, exercising control over means oof infringement, offering tools to assist in infringement, instructing how to infringe).
 - 1. This element is disputed.
 - 2. Nature of Dispute: Legal and Factual

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3. Plaintiff's Position Statement: it is assumed that the primary dispute by Defendants here will be as to the underlying question of infringement (ownership, license, etc.). But if it is true that Plaintiff owned the Marks, and had exclusive right to control them and Defendants lost their right on May 31, 2024, the question is fairly on the table whether (1) PCJV, the former licensees of the brand, engaged in post termination contribution or inducement to its sublicensees whose rights had also been terminated by giving them aid and comfort (and collecting money from them) after termination,, or (2) the supply chain affiliate PCI Trading's sales of infringing cups etc. was constituted contribution or inducement, or (3) whether Koren, the owner or operator oof them all was also responsible for contribution or inducement. 115 USC 1114; Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264-65 (9th Cir. 1996) (applied to host of swap meets when host know infringement was occurring); citing Inwood Lab'ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab'ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982); see Inwood Lab'ys, Inc., 456 U.S. at 844, 854 (1982) (explaining that when a party "suppl[ies]] its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark manufacturer infringement, the or distributor contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit"). Defendants' Position Statement: To establish liability for

4. <u>Defendants' Position Statement:</u> To establish liability for contributory infringement, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the defendant had intent to cause direct

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infringement or prior knowledge of direct infringement. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007). That is not the same thing as having knowledge of a bona fide dispute over trademark ownership or authorization to use a trademark. Similarly, officer or director liability includes a knowledge requirement to establish liability. SinCo Technologies Pte Ltd. v. SinCo Electronics, Case No. 17-cv-05517-EMC, 2018 WL 10638468, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018).

- 5. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Testimony and statements of Koren, franchisees, and SPAVI executives after termination; correspondence with franchisees by SPAVI; Franchise agreements and FDDs.
- 6. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: documents testimony including and related to (1) the evidentiary record establishing a bona fide trademark dispute over ownership and authorization to use the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks; (2) the alleged contributory infringing Defendants did not have the intent to cause infringement or knowledge that direct infringement was occurring; (3) the alleged contributory infringing Defendants are not similarly situated, including because some our downstream users (who contributing nothing upstream) and one is simply a supplier of publicly available materials; (4) Mr. Koren, as an officer or member of Defendant entities, also had no intent to confuse consumers, had no intent to trade off the goodwill he did not own or have authorization to

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Koren, PCJV USA, LL, PCI Trading, LLC, Potato Corner LA Group, LLC; GK Capital, LLC or NKM Capital Group, LLC

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- a. <u>Element No. 1:</u> inducement of any Defendant to make use a false designation, such as a word, term, name, device, or a combination thereof, or a false designation of origin (affirmative steps or actions taken to encourage infringement, exercising control over means oof infringement, offering tools to assist in infringement, instructing how to infringe).
 - ii. This element is disputed.
 - iii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and Factual
 - iv. Plaintiff's Position Statement: it is assumed that the primary dispute by Defendants here will be as to the underlying question of infringement (ownership, license, etc.). But if it is true that Plaintiff owned the Marks, and had exclusive right to control them and Defendants lost their right on May 31, 2024, the question is fairly on the table whether (1) PCJV, the former licensees of the brand, engaged in post termination contribution or inducement to its sublicensees whose rights had also been terminated by giving them aid and comfort (and collecting money from them) after termination,, or (2) the supply chain affiliate PCI Trading's sales of infringing cups etc. was constituted contribution or inducement, or (3) whether Koren, the owner or operator oof them all was also responsible for contribution or inducement. 115 USC 1114; Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264–65 (9th Cir. 1996) (applied to host of swap meets when host know infringement was occurring); citing Inwood Lab'ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab'ys, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982); see Inwood Lab'ys, Inc., 456 U.S. at 844, 854 (1982) (explaining that when a party "suppl[ies]] its product to one whom it

knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit").

- Defendants' Position Statement: To establish liability for contributory infringement, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the defendant had intent to cause direct infringement or prior knowledge of direct infringement. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 2007). That is not the same thing as having knowledge of a bona fide dispute over trademark ownership or authorization to use a trademark. Similarly, officer or director liability includes a knowledge requirement to establish liability. SinCo Technologies Pte Ltd. v. SinCo Electronics, Case No. 17-cv-05517-EMC, 2018 WL 10638468, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018).
- vi. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Testimony and statements of Koren, franchisees, and SPAVI executives after termination; correspondence with franchisees by SPAVI; Franchise agreements and FDDs.
- vii. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> documents and testimony including and related to (1) the evidentiary record establishing a bona fide trademark dispute over ownership and authorization to use the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks; (2) the alleged contributory infringing Defendants did not have the intent to cause infringement or knowledge that direct infringement was occurring; (3) the alleged contributory infringing Defendants are not similarly situated, including because some our downstream users (who contributing nothing

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1	infringement and this case, the holdover licensee, where the
2	standard for likelihood of confusion is lowered, and even
3	sometimes presumed, and irreparable harm is also presumed.
4	The Lanham Act allows Defendants to raise the other
5	arguments to rebut the presumption of irreparable harm, but
6	the standard as applied here allows for disgorgement,
7	iii. PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement: Defendants
8	incorporate their legal positions above regarding liability and
9	damages for direct infringement and liability for contributory
10	infringement. In addition, damages for contributory
11	infringement should not be awarded upstream.
12	iv. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Defendants have
13	produced financials for the period in question May 31, 2024
14	through the present, and, given that the entirety off their
15	business is built off the confusion, we only need to prove
16	profits which can be disgorged. Thus, the financials as well as
17	Koren testimony and testimony of franchisees as well; as
18	correspondence regarding costs of goods sold as well as the
19	testimony of the CFO of Shakley's will establish damage. No
20	expert is needed for arithmetic. To the contrary, it is
21	Defendant who bears a heavier burden of establishing what
22	costs or expenses "actually contributed to the sale of the
23	infringing products." Monster Energy Co. v. Integrated
24	Supply Network, LLC, 533 F. Supp. 3d 928, 938 (C.D. Cal.
25	2021)
26	iii. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> Defendants incorporate
27	their above record.
28	2) Claim 6: Common Law Trademark Infringement Against All

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Defendants (Against Guy Koren, PCJV USA, LL, PCI Trading, LLC,
Potato Corner LA Group, LLC; GK Capital, LLC or NKM Capital
Group, LLC).

- a. <u>Element No. 1:</u> the Word Mark, Slogan Mark, and/or the Logo Mark (all collectively, the "Marks") are valid and protectible trademarks:
 - i. This element is undisputed
- b. <u>Element No. 2:</u> Plaintiff owns the Word Mark, Slogan Mark, and/or the Logo Mark
 - i. This element is disputed.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual and Legal.
 - Plaintiff's Legal Position: Defendants do not dispute that iii. the registrations for all three Marks (Trial Exhibit Nos. 1, 3, and 5) identify Cinco as the registrant and the first to use each of the three Marks, nor do Defendants dispute that the Deeds of Assignment attached to the notices filed with the USPTO (Trial Exhibit Nos. 4 and 6) confirm that, unequivocally and without exception, the entirety of these Marks were sold and assigned to Plaintiff, along with all the goodwill arising out of or associated with the Marks. Defendants also do not dispute the testimony of Seller (Cinco) and Buyer (SPAVI) that the Deeds are accurate in every way, that the sale and assignments were comprehensive, without carve outs, and fully consummated. Instead, Defendants take internally inconsistent positions that are contradicted by various legal doctrine, including the ones discussed *supra*: Licensee Estoppel, the Lanham Act provisions rendering Defendants' positions contrary to federal law, Law of the Case, that the Authorities

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- cited by Defendants do not support their position, including *Sengoku*, the Merger Doctrine, and Defendants' standing.
- ii. <u>Defendants' Position Statement:</u> Defendants incorporate their legal positions above
- iii. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO filings including Registrations and Assignments, testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), FDDs, Franchise Agreements.
- iv. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> Defendants incorporate their above factual positions
- c. <u>Element No. 3:</u> Defendants used Word Mark, Slogan Mark, and/or the Logo Mark in interstate commerce after May 31, 2024:
 - i. This element is undisputed.
- d. <u>Element No. 4:</u> Defendants' use of the Word Mark, Slogan Mark, and/or the Logo Mark in interstate commerce after May 31, 2024, was without the consent of Plaintiff and in a manner likely to cause confusion among ordinary consumers as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or approval of the services.
 - ii. This element is disputed.
 - iii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and Factual
 - iv. <u>Plaintiff's Legal Position:</u> As for absence of consent, given the absence of any ownership rights, Defendants must locate some rights as a licensee of the owner (SPAVI). Defendants offer two documents proffered as agreements that bind Cinco to a perpetual license. Neither work as a matter of law. First, they offer the unsigned October 10, 2010, document containing terms for a Master License Agreement (Trial

royalty recovery. Second, Plaintiffs point to § 3(g) of an Amended Joint Venture Agreement (and its predecessor the Joint Venture Agreement) – Trial Exhibit Nos. 8 and 9 – which this Court has already interpreted to constitute an agreement to agree, in the future, with Cinco on a license agreement. As the Ninth Circuit said in affirming this conclusion, "the AJVA contained an agreement to enter a future Master License Agreement, not a "perpetual license" like PCJV claims." Shakeys Pizza Asia Ventures, Inc. v. PCJV USA, LLC, No. 24- 7084, 2025 WL 1431270, at *1 (9th Cir. May 19, 2025) (citing First Nat'l Mortg. Co. v. Fed. Realty Inv. Tr., 631 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[A]n 'agreement to agree,' without more, is not a binding contract."). This interpretation of the AJVA and JVA is a legal conclusion, which, as affirmed by the Ninth Circuit are legal conclusions, and, as such, these are pure conclusions of law, which means: this Court's conclusion that § 3(g) of the JVA and AJVA are	I	
concluding that it is an unsigned draft (as Koren's testimony has confirmed) and illusory because the licensor is given no consideration for this purported agreement. The unsigned document cannot, as a matter of law, have bound Cinco, even through implied contract law, because Cinco did not do anything in furtherance of that document to imply its assent. Moreover, multiple times after October 10, 2010, documents were signed stating that Cinco would be expecting a 30% royalty recovery. Second, Plaintiffs point to § 3(g) of an Amended Joint Venture Agreement (and its predecessor the Joint Venture Agreement) – Trial Exhibit Nos. 8 and 9 – which this Court has already interpreted to constitute an agreement to agree, in the future, with Cinco on a license agreement. As the Ninth Circuit said in affirming this conclusion, "the AJVA contained an agreement to enter a future Master License Agreement, not a "perpetual license" like PCJV claims." Shakeys Pizza Asia Ventures, Inc. v. PCJV USA, LLC, No. 24-7084, 2025 WL 1431270, at *1 (9th Cir. May 19, 2025) (citing First Nat'l Mortg. Co. v. Fed. Realty Inv. Tr., 631 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[A]n 'agreement to agree,' without more, is not a binding contract."). This interpretation of the AJVA and JVA is a legal conclusion, which, as affirmed by the Ninth Circuit are legal conclusions, and, as such, these are pure conclusions of law, which means: this Court's conclusion that § 3(g) of the JVA and AJVA are	1	Exhibit No. 11), which this Court (and the Ninth Circuit) have
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	28	agreements to agree and do not bind Cinco to a

"perpetual license" are law of the case and cannot be	
disturbed or challenged at trial. This theory based on	
interpretation of a contract has been considered and rejected by	
this Court and the Ninth Circuit in this case, and because it is	
a "pure issue[] of law, however, [it is] binding" on Defendants	
under law of the case. Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund	
United Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S. Dep't of Agr., 499 F.3d	
1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007); see, e.g. Arizona v. California, 460	
U.S. 605, 618 (1983) ((citing the rule as being "when a court	
decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to	
govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same	
case"). Defendants now trot out other theories such the fact	
that the JVA and prior Operating Agreement are still	
somewhat live under a theory of partial integration, however,	
the following point prevails over each of these contortions:	
Defendants can point to no agreement or document, or acct, or	
statement, binding Cinco to a perpetual, irrevocable, royalty	
free licensee of its Marks. As such, in the absence of any	
written agreement, or documentation of any license terms, the	
sole license that existed as of May 31, 2024, was implied and	
terminable at will See Pogrebnoy v. Russian Newspaper	
Distribution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1070 (C.D. Cal.	
2017), aff'd, 742 F. App'x 291 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[A]n implied	
license, like any other contract, is terminable at the will of	
either party if it is not for a specified term."). One final flaw	
exists in the attempt to bind Cinco to the AJVA, and that is	
one of issue preclusion in favor of Plaintiffs. As evidenced by	
Plaintiff's own Third Amended Complaint (verified) in the	

Prior Governance Action, the entire pleading is based on the theory that -- and it sought judgment concluding that -- Cinco is an alter ego of the entity that was a 60% member of PCJV. (See Trial Exhibit No. 1421 p. 7:3-14.) Such allegations, having been dismissed, with prejudice, by Koren, re4nder thee accusations extinguished, and, as such, Defendants are precluded from alleging them ever again.

Regarding likelihood of confusion, which may be presumed, and the jury may be so instructed "[w]here,' as here, "a licensee persists in the unauthorized use of a licensor's trademark, courts have found that the continued use alone establishes a likelihood of consumer confusion." *Robert Trent Jones II, Inc. v. GFSI, Inc.*, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing and quoting *Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft Corp.*, 999 F.Supp. 1301, 1311 (N.D.Cal.1998) (citing *Paisa, Inc. v. N & G Auto, Inc.*, 928 F.Supp. 1009, 1012 n. 4 (C.D.Cal.1996); *Hollywood Athletic Club*, 938 F.Supp. at 614–15 (C.D.Cal.1996)). The Sixth Circuit's analysis in Max Rack, Inc. v. Core Health & Fitness, LLC, 40 F.4th 454, 464 (6th Cir. 2022) is instructive:

"A separate body of law has developed for this distinct claim that a holdover licensee has continued to use a licensor's mark after their agreement expired. See 4 McCarthy, supra, § 25:31 (citing cases). In this context, courts have jettisoned the usual totality-of-the-circumstances test in favor of a more categorical rule: "proof of continued, unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish 'likelihood of confusion.' " U.S.

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Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1190 (6th Cir. 1997); ITT Indus., Inc. v. Wastecorp. Inc., 87 F. App'x 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2004); Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1989); Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1492–93 (11th Cir. 1983); Pro. Golfers Ass'n of Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1975); L & L Wings, Inc. v. Marco-Destin, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 179, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). This rule makes good sense when a holdover licensee blatantly infringes the licensor's mark by using that mark in the same way as it did before the agreement expired. Without any need to tick through factors, it should be obvious that consumers will believe, for example, that a pizza restaurant remains affiliated with the "Little Caesars" chain when a terminated franchisee continues to operate the pizzeria as a Little Caesars. See Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Miramar Quick Serv. Rest. Corp., 2020 WL 4516289, at *3 (6th Cir. 2020) (order)"

Although Plaintiff intends to, and will, adduce proof of the Sleekcraft factors, the presumption exists, and it is entitled to stand on this presumption alone.

- v. <u>Defendants' Position Statement:</u> Defendants incorporate all their above legal positions.
- vi. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Trial Exhibit 29 (May 31, 2024 Termination); photographs of various stores taken from May 31, 2025 through the present; Testimony of Koren; Plaintiff executives Gregorio (Plaiuntiff's CEO), Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO charged with US operations), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising); investigator; Franchisees; Kim Lambert and Barry Kurtz; in addition to the

following documents Amended Joint Venture Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement.

vii. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> Defendants incorporate their above factual positions.

3) Claim 9 (from FAC, Dkt. 65): Quantum Meruit Against PCJV

- a. <u>Element No. 1:</u> That Defendant requested, by words or conduct, that Plaintiff provide a license to use the Potato Corner Intellectual Property for the benefit of Defendant PCJV;
 - i. This element is disputed.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and Factual
 - iii. <u>Plaintiff's Position Statement:</u> Defendants' issues are factual and not legal.
 - iv. Defendants' Position Statement: Quantum meruit is an implied contract (or quasi-contract) claim stemming from requested services "under which a plaintiff who has rendered services benefiting the defendant may recover the reasonable value of those services when necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant." In re De Laurentiis Ent. Grp. Inc., 963 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff will be unable to establish liability for *quantum meruit* for three reasons: Defendants (1) "requested" no (2) "services" from Plaintiff for which Plaintiff had a (3) "reasonable expectation" of payment. See McLeod v. Zero Gravity Mgmt., 2:22-CV-01547-FWS-AGR, 2024 WL 3304527, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2024); see also Corsini v. Canyon Equity, LLC, C-10-2061-JL, 2011 WL13247447, at *6 (N.D. Cal, May 23, 2011). Plaintiff's quantum meruit cause of action does not contain critical elements of the cause of action. See CACI No. 317.

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v. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Course of Dealings between Defendants and SPAVI,. Specifically, Defendants have no evidence of a written license to use SPAVI's Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and, as such, its rights (that it has sold to its franchisees) derive from what is, at best, a terminable at will, fully revocable license because Defendants were nonetheless operating Potato Corner locations, as if a written license existed. See Pogrebnoy v. Russian Newspaper Distribution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd, 742 F. App'x 291 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[A]n implied license, like any other contract, is terminable at the will of either party if it is not for a specified term."). After SPAVI's acquisition of the Potato Corner brand, it became the licensor of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. Between December of 2021 through 2024, the months immediately preceding this action, SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to negotiate the terms of a written license with PCJV. Defendant Guy Koren engaged and participated in this negotiation; Testimony of Koren, Plaintiff executives Gregorio (Plaiuntiff's CEO), Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO charged with US operations), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO); Emails and correspondence with SPAVI, Koren, and PCJV relating to negotiations of a licensing agreement for the use of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property; Amended Joint Venture Agreement; Franchise Agreements; FDDs vi. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: (1) There was no request for services; PCJV USA, LLC's objected to Plaintiff's transaction

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with its former fiduciary and joint venture partner Cinco

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	Corporation and asserted its pre-existing rights to use and
	control Potato Corner in the United States; it did not "request"
	any services from Plaintiff; rather, PCJV USA, LLC's became
	subject to an involuntary interloper in breach of Cinco
	Corporation's fiduciary and contractual obligations; (2) No
	"services" were provided by Plaintiff to PCJV USA, LLC's
	within the meaning of quantum meruit even according to
	Plaintiff's own authority cited in its Memorandum of
	Contentions of Law and Fact (Dkt. No. 199, citing Cosmonova,
	LLC v. BioFilm, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 3d 1157 (S.D. Cal. 2025)
	(dismissing quantum meruit claim)). Rather, Plaintiff allegedly
	provided an implied "at-will" license allegedly extinguishing
	PCJV USA, LLC's long-term right to use and/or to a long-term
	license, which was beneficial to Plaintiff, indeed far more
	beneficial to Plaintiff, and thus not a "service" within the
	meaning of quantum meruit. Cosmonova, LLC, 763 F. Supp. 3d
	at 1172. (3) Plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of any
	royalty payment to Plaintiff for the same reason no royalty is
	recoverable under the Lanham Act. Plaintiff never paid a royalty
	to Cinco Corporation, no claim for breach of contract was
	brought by Cinco Corporation, and Plaintiff cannot put itself
	into a better situation than its assignor, Cinco Corporation. See
	McCarthy, supra, § 18:15 ("It is elementary ancient law that an
	assignee never stands in any better position than his
	assignor") (citation omitted). Defendants are simply seeking
	a windfall or to punish Defendants' exercise of First
	Amendment rights.
a.	Element No. 2: That Plaintiff provided such license to use the Potato

Corner Intellectual Property as requested by Defendant PCJV. 1 2 i. This element is disputed. ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and Factual 3 4 iii. Plaintiff's Position Statement: this is a factual dispute. 5 iv. Defendants' Position Statement: Defendant disputes Element 2 for the same reason they dispute Element 1. 6 7 v. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Defendants have operated 8 Potato Corner locations that utilize the Potato Corner 9 Intellectual Property through what is, at best, a terminable at will, fully revocable license because Defendants were 10 nonetheless operating Potato Corner locations, as if a written 11 license existed. See Pogrebnoy v. Russian Newspaper 12 Distribution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2017), 13 aff'd, 742 F. App'x 291 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[A]n implied license, 14 15 like any other contract, is terminable at the will of either party if 16 it is not for a specified term."). SPAVI has consented to that use 17 until the termination of the license agreement on May 31, 2024; Trial Exhibit 29 (May 31, 2024 Termination); Testimony of 18 Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO charged with US operations), Tan 19 20 (Director responsible for international franchising), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Koren; Emails and correspondence with SPAVI, 21 22 Koren, and PCJV relating to negotiations of a licensing 23 agreement for the use of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property; Amended Joint Venture Agreement; Franchise Agreements; 24 25 **FDDs** 26 vi. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: Defendant relies upon the 27 same record evidence to dispute both Elements 1 and 2 28 b. Element No. 3: That Defendant has not paid Plaintiff royalties or any

1	other compensation to Plaintiff for the use of the Potato Corner
2	Intellectual Property
3	i. This element is disputed.
4	ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and Factual
5	iii. <u>Plaintiff's Position Statement:</u> Plaintiff does not know
6	what the issue is here.
7	iv. <u>Defendants' Position Statement:</u> Defendant disputes
8	Element 3 for the same reason they dispute Element 1.
9	v. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Financial statements
10	produced by Defendants showing that there have been no
11	royalty fees paid to SPAVI; Testimony of Koren, Plaintiff
12	executives Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Concepcion (Plaintiff's
13	COO charged with US operations), Tan (Director responsible
14	for international franchising), Jose Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO)
15	vi. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> Defendant relies upon
16	the same record evidence to dispute both Elements 1 and 2.
17	c. Element No. 4: The reasonable value for the use of the Potato Corner
18	Intellectual Property that was provided.
19	i. This element is disputed.
20	ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual
21	v. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Financial statements produced
22	by Defendants showing that there have been no royalty fees paid
23	to SPAVI; Testimony of Koren, Plaintiff executives Gregorio
24	(Plaintiff's CEO), Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO charged with
25	US operations), Tan (Director responsible for international
26	franchising), Jose Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO); Notarized Deeds
27	signed by seller and buyer; USPTO filings including
28	Registrations and Assignments

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1	iii. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> The reasonable value
	is nominal or \$1.00 because the 15-year track record is equal
	payment of royalties and service fees (followed by and waiver in
	favor of growth). See McCarthy, supra, § 18:15 ("'It is
	elementary ancient law that an assignee never stands in any
	better position than his assignor") (citation omitted).

4) Claim 10 (from FAC, Dkt. 65): Misappropriation of Trade Secrets

- a. Element No. 1: That SPAVI owned the recipes, ingredients, and ingredient allocations for its proprietary flavorings, the identities of its suppliers, and other know-how, procedures, and processes used and employed at Potato Corner outlets, including outlets owned and/or operated by Defendants ("Potato Corner Trade Secrets")
 - i. This element is disputed.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and Factual
 - [If legal dispute] Plaintiff's Position Statement:] iii.
 - Defendants' Position Statement: As a threshold matter, a iv. trade secret could only comprise "information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process." Cal. Civ. Code 3426.1(d). SPAVI has not identified what "information" it claims Defendants misappropriated. "Flavors" is not information, and packaging is an object. Thus, SPAVI cannot carry its burden to "identify the trade secrets and carry the burden of showing they exist." InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Global Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 653, 658. A flavor is an idea and catch-all phrase, which is not protected. Id.; Silvaco Data Systems v. Intel Corp., 184 Cal. App. 4th 210, 220 (2010). Moreover, the plaintiff must "own"

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the trade secret—meaning the plaintiff either has title to the secret or has knowledge of the know how and licenses it with a confidentiality obligation. See Sinclair v. Aquarius Electronics, Inc., 42 Cal.App.3d 216, 225-228 (1974) (trade secret licensing involves sharing sensitive, undisclosed information). A conclusory assignment from a prior reseller with no knowledge of the trade secret does not establish the required chain of title. Memry Corp. v. Kentucky Oil Technology, N.V., No. C-04-03843 RMW, 2006 WL 3734384, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2006). Here, there is no evidence of the existence or ownership of trade secret information

- Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: SPAVI owns all trademarks, service marks, recipes, trade secrets, and other intellectual property affiliated with the Potato Corner brand. SPAVI acquired all of this intellectual property from the thenowners, Cinco Corporation ("Cinco"), in a deal that closed in 2022. Additional evidence includes: Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO filings including Registrations and Assignments, testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising),
- Defendants' Supporting Evidence: the following category, vi. which is defined above, captures the key phase and supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct. Among other things, Cinco Corporation's consent to reverse engineering of spices means that Plaintiff's predecessor did not know the alleged secret, did not own or have a trade secret license, and did not assign one to Plaintiff.

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- b. Element No. 2: That these Potato Corner Trade Secrets were a secret at the time of the misappropriation
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual
 - iii. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: The Potato Corner brand is identifiable by its preparation of fries, which uses seven proprietary flavorings sold to SPAVI by one single supplier, the identity of which is confidential and not publicly known. The ingredients are not known outside the Potato Corner family, and the specific recipe (and proportions of each ingredient) are also kept secret. SPAVI maintains and benefits from the secrecy of the recipes and ingredient allocation of each flavoring and requires its supplier to protect that secrecy. The only persons with access to the flavoring packets delivered from the supplier (with ingredients listed but not quantities and proportions) are those bound by confidentiality and secrecy in favor. Anyone with access to the flavoring packages and ingredients is prohibited from using them for a purpose other than for the Potato Corner brand's benefit and may not misappropriate or take for themselves any of the proprietary information embodied in those packets. Additional evidence includes: The Franchise Disclosure Documents ("FDD"); agreements with the Franchisees; testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising), and Franchisees iv. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: supplier agreements;

third-party Ferna's sale of spices to the public that SPAVI

contends are secret; Cinco Corporation's consent for reverse engineering of spices (meaning it did not know the alleged secret and thus did not have a trade secret license); and SPAVI's lack of evidence demonstrating it maintain secrecy, including but not limited to non-disclosure agreements, physically locked storage of product and recipes alleged to be trade secrets, use of two-factor authentication to access online storage of recipes alleged to be trade secrets, monitoring and securing of employees' and agents' communications and use technology to transfer data to third parties, such as by way of flash drives and cloud storage.

- c. <u>Element No. 3:</u> That Defendants improperly acquired, used, or disclosed the Potato Corner Trade Secrets
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and Factual
 - iii. Plaintiff's Position Statement:
 - iv. Defendants' Position Statement: By statute, reverse engineering is fair competition. It follows that, to establish wrongful acquisition, use or disclosure, Plaintiff must establish a legal duty in the acquisition of a product not to reverse engineer it. However, Plaintiff denies and cannot establish any legal duty between Plaintiff and Defendants as it affirmatively alleges they are not fiduciaries, it did not assume obligations and there is no privity of contract establishing any confidentiality obligation between them
 - v. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Both the JVA and AJVA contain an agreement to agree on a Master License Agreement. However, there was never a written license agreement between

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Plaintiff and Defendants. After SPAVI acquired the Potato
Corner intellectual property rights, which included the Potato
Corner Trade Secrets, SPAVI engaged in a good faith and
exhaustive attempt to negotiate the terms of a written license
with Defendants. Defendant Guy Koren engaged and
participated in this negotiation, but was unwilling to agree to
any minimally commercially viable licensing terms. Moreover,
Guy Koren refused to, engage in reasonable and good faith
negotiation. Instead, he only offered royalty rates and license
fees that were more than 90% below what Koren had agreed to
be reasonable licensing fees over a decade prior. Koren also
repeatedly disengaged from the negotiation process, but still
was utilizing the Potato Corner Intellectual Property.
Therefore, SPAVI terminated the license agreement as of May
31, 2024. After the termination, Defendants improperly,
illegally, and unfairly misappropriated the flavoring packages
in their possession, which should have been returned
immediately following receipt of the May 31, 2024,
Termination Letter, and transferred possession of those
proprietary packages of flavorings to a third party for the
purpose of reverse-engineering the flavorings directly from the
packages themselves. Defendants also developed "Undercover
Fries" to roll out the reverse engineered fries to compete with
the Potato Corner brand while, at the same time, operating
Potato Corner outlets and being in possession of the Potato
Corner Intellectual Property, including the Potato Corner
Trade Secrets. Additional evidence includes: Franchisee
Photographs; Testimony from former franchisees, Concepcion

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(Plaintiff's COO charged with US operations), Koren, investigator; the Franchise Agreements; FDDs; and leases, of PCJV over the years.

- i. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), and Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance.
- d. <u>Element No. 4:</u> That SPAVI was harmed and/or Defendants were unjustly enriched by its use of the Potato Corner Trade Secrets i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual
 - iii. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: The secrecy of the Potato Corner Trade Secrets holds value to SPAVI. The reverse engineering was an unauthorized taking of a trade secret for Defendants own personal benefit to open a competing store "Undercover Fries". Additional evidence includes: Franchisee Photographs; Testimony from former franchisees, Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO charged with US operations), Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising), and Koren; the Franchise Agreements; FDDs; leases, of PCJV over the years; and financial statements of Defendants.
 - iv. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: Defendants incorporate their above factual positions
- e. <u>Element No. 5:</u> Defendants acquisition, use, or disclosure of the Potato

1	Corner Trade Secrets was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's
2	harm or for Defendants to be unjustly enriched.
3	i. This element is disputed
4	ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual
5	iii. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Defendants'
6	misappropriation, wrongful disclosure, and/or repudiation of
7	the existence of SPAVI's above-described trade secrets and
8	proprietary information, SPAVI has been damaged and
9	continues to be damaged. Evidence includes: Defendants
10	financials for the period in question May 31, 2024 through the
11	present; testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Ybanez
12	(Plaintiff's General Counsel), Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO
13	charged with US operations), Tan (Director responsible for
14	international franchising), Koren, franchisees.
15	iv. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: Defendants
16	incorporate their above factual positions
17	I. <u>Defendants' Affirmative Defenses to be Tried by a Jury</u>
18	1) Affirmative Defense No. 1: Waiver (asserted by all Defendants as to
19	all claims alleged by SPAVI against them)
20	a. Element No. 1: Through implied and/or express conduct, SPAVI
21	knowingly waived a valid right, privilege, advantage, or benefit
22	allegedly conferred upon it and its attempt to enforce that right,
23	privilege, advantage, or benefit is thus barred.
24	i. The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
25	ii. <u>Nature of Dispute:</u> Factual and Legal
26	iii. <u>Defendants' Position Statement:</u> The specific rights or
27	privileges that have been waived include the alleged right to
28	terminate PCJV USA, LLC's right to use the U.S. Potato

1	Corner marks, and the alleged right to claim that the purchased
2	seasoning packages were secret and improperly acquired.
3	Plaintiff's enforcement waiver is based on Plaintiff and
4	Plaintiff's predecessor's knowing acquiescence in PCVJ USA,
5	LLC's use and quality control of Potato Corner in the United
6	States, including before and after Plaintiff's alleged acquisition
7	of the same. See McCarthy, supra, § 18:15 ("It is elementary
8	ancient law that an assignee never stands in any better position
9	than his assignor,' thus once an assignee has notice of an
10	injunction against the assignor, it is bound to comply.")
11	(citation omitted). Plaintiff's predecessor acquiesced for years
12	in PCJV USA, LLC's use and quality contract. The fact of
13	Plaintiff's due diligence, negotiations, and alleged transaction
14	with Cinco Corporation before allegedly acquiring the U.S.
15	trademarks put Plaintiff on actual notice of PCJV USA, LLC's
16	use and control rights, and in response Plaintiff represented
17	that it would be bound by any agreements related to the
18	licensing of Potato Corner intellectual property in the United
19	State, and thereafter did not attempt to enforce any alleged
20	contrary right for years and then denied acquiring PCJV USA,
21	LLC's use and quality control rights. As to the commercial
22	sale of packaged seasonings, both Plaintiff and its predecessor
23	have known for years that they did not own them, that they
24	were publicly available for purchase in the market, and that it
25	was not improper to reverse engineer them, and Plaintiff
26	thereafter fulfilled an order and agreed to a fulfill a second
27	order even after the alleged termination.
28	iv. Plaintiff's Position Statement: Defendants fail to identify any

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specific right or privilege or benefit that was waived. The only relationship between SPAVI and any Defendant, was that of licensor to licensee, pursuant to an implied license. The only right that SPAVI possessed was to terminate or negotiate. It decision to wait to negotiate with Koren is not a waiver oof its right to terminate. Ironically, it is SPAVI that is alleging that Defendants waived their right to claim the AJVA confers perpetual licensing rights, after negotiating the terms of a written license that would confer narrower rights for three years without once taking the position that it did not need a written license – a three year period during which much occurred in reliance on Korenn's assent to the need for a written license.

v. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> The PCJV USA Parties intend to rely on testimony and also on a robust written evidentiary record which demonstrates the parties' mutual intentions and the evolution of their business relationship from the inception through the present. The following categories and chronology capture the key phases and supporting evidence: 1. Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), including (a) testimony and documentary evidence (i.e., communications and the original NKM Master License Agreement) showing the parties' shared intent to bring Potato Corner to the U.S., (b) exhibits reflecting the transition from a simple license to a joint venture partnership in 2009-2010, including meeting minutes, correspondence, and planning documents from April/May 2010, (c) evidence of the July 2010 formation of PCJV USA, LLC as the master franchisor

for all U.S. and Israel operations, with PCJV granted all rights
to use and license the U.S. intellectual property ("Superseding
Joint Venture (2008–2010)"); 2. Alternative Licensing
Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012),
including (a) documents and communications (i.e., DLA Piper
records, regulatory filings, and Franchise Disclosure
Documents) evidencing the parties' reliance on an alternative
license agreement in 2011 for Cinco's benefit, which was
referenced and ratified in annual FDDs and other regulatory
filings, (b) evidence of the 2012 Master Services Agreement,
which authorized the LA Group to license the brand for an
indefinite duration, further reflecting the parties' mutual
understanding and operational structure ("Alternative
Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–
2012)"); 3. Formalization and Modification of the Joint
Venture (2012), including (a) executed copies of the Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) and the LLC Operating Agreement
from August 2012, memorializing the parties' rights,
obligations, and governance structure, (b) the First
Amendment to the JVA (October 2012), with supporting
meeting minutes, documenting specific modifications to the
parties' governance protocols only ("Formalization and
Modification of the Joint Venture (2012)"); 4. LA Group
Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and
Terms (2013–2018), including (a) the 2013 written partnership
agreement entered into by the LA Group, reflecting further
refinement of the parties' roles and expectations, (b)
communications, board minutes, and negotiation records from

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2015–2018 detailing ongoing discussions about operational challenges, restructuring proposals (including Koren's

potential acquisition of Cinco shares or the LA Group's acquisition of 100% of PCJV/PCI Trading), and a

contemplated new Master License Agreement for Cinco's

benefit in exchange for 100% ownership in PCJV/PCI Trading

("LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business

Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018)"); 5. Dispute, Litigation,

and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), including (a) evidence of the April 2018 board meeting and resolutions that

precipitated the state court litigation, including verified

pleadings, declarations, and court filings that set forth the

parties' mutual intentions and positions during the dispute,

including also, if necessary, settlement negotiation discussions

and the settlement and other agreements reached among the

parties, (b) additional documents and testimony from the state

court proceedings, including verified cross-complaints, declarations, and orders, which further clarify the parties'

understanding and course of conduct ("Dispute, Litigation, and

State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond)"); 6. Ongoing

Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance, including

FDDs, regulatory filings, and correspondence with state

agencies, evidencing the parties' continued mutual recognition

of the licensing and franchising structure, as well as the

ratification of their agreements and operational practices

("Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance");

7. SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct, including a

comprehensive body of documents and testimony which

demonstrates the SPAVI parties' coordinated and wrongful
actions aimed at appropriating the business operations, supply
chain, and goodwill of the Potato Corner USA franchise
system for their own benefit, such as (a) testimony and
documentary evidence showing SPAVI's deliberate efforts to
undermine and take over PCJV's established franchise
network in the United States, (b) communications, internal
memoranda, and correspondence reflecting SPAVI's outreach
to PCJV franchisees, including direct offers of temporary
licenses and inducements to sever ties with PCJV, as detailed
in termination letters and related notices, (c) evidence of
SPAVI's attempts to bypass PCJV's role as franchisor by
negotiating directly with third-party franchisees, thereby
disrupting existing contractual relationships and causing
business uncertainty, (d) documents and witness statements
establishing SPAVI's interference with PCI Trading's
procurement and distribution of supplies, (e) testimony
regarding SPAVI's refusal to supply powders to PCJV and its
franchisees following the purported termination of the license,
thereby jeopardizing ongoing operations and franchisee
livelihoods, (f) evidence of SPAVI's efforts to control or
redirect supplier relationships, including attempts to obtain
confidential supplier information and to assert exclusive rights
over the sourcing and distribution of Potato Corner products in
the U.S., (g) testimony and exhibits documenting SPAVI's use
of the established Potato Corner USA brand reputation and
customer base to promote its own interests, including public
statements, regulatory filings, and direct communications with

1	franchisees and suppliers, (h) rather than simply seeking
2	declaratory relief, SPAVI's own conduct has interjected
3	potential confusion in the marketplace, including the
4	unauthorized use of trademarks, solicitation of franchisees, and
5	dissemination of misleading information regarding the status
6	of the franchise system and intellectual property rights, (i)
7	documents showing SPAVI's attempts to claim ownership of
8	the goodwill and business relationships cultivated by PCJV
9	and PCI Trading over years of operation, despite the absence
10	of any direct contractual relationship with many U.S.
11	franchisees prior to the dispute, (j) evidence of the resulting
12	harm to PCJV, PCI Trading, and the broader franchise
13	network, including lost business opportunities, damaged
14	supplier relationships, and erosion of brand value and goodwill
15	("SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct")
16	vi. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: testimony of the negotiators
17	from 2021 through 2024 including Mr. Gregorio and Mr. Tan
18	(from SSPAVI), their correspondence with Koren and his
19	testimony, the NKM License agreement and the JVA and
20	AJVA (none of which SPAAVI is a party to or conferred
21	rights that SPAVI is responsible for. The absence of
22	contractual privity or otherwise is what disproves this
23	affirmative defense.
24	b. Causes of Action Barred by this Affirmative Defense: all of SPAVI's
25	causes of action
26	2) Affirmative Defense No. 2: In Pari Delicto (asserted as to all of
27	SPAVI's causes of action).

a. Element No. 1: Plaintiff and Defendants have substantially equal

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- c. Element No. 3: Plaintiff was not held by economic pressure to engage in harmful conduct.
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 3: The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and Factual.

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- iii. Defendants' Position Statement: Defendants' elements precisely follow CACI No. 3431.
- iv. <u>Plaintiff's Position Statement</u>: the statement of these elements omit that to apply "in pari dilecto" requires that SPPAVI have engaged in "illegal, fraudulent, or inequitable conduct," and that has never been alleged, nor is there any evidence of this.
- v. Defendant's Supporting Evidence: documents and testimony including and related to (1) PCJV USA, LLC's right to use Potato Corner IP and quality control rights related thereto under PCJV USA, LLC's governing documents, including agreements and related negotiations, franchise disclosure documents and board minutes; (2) the parties' course of conduct regarding PCJV USA, LLC's use and control of U.S. Potato Corner trademarks; (3) the fact of SPAVI's due diligence, negotiations, and alleged acquisition of Cinco Corporation's assets and liabilities; (4) SPAVI's denial of acquiring any IP rights or obligations under PCJV's governing documents; (5) SPAVI's statement that it would be bound by a settlement with Cinco; (6) SPAVI's knowing failure to do anything for years regarding PCJV USA Parties' full exercise of its right to use and quality control; and (7) SPAVI's decision to renege on a purchase order, creating a short-term supply chain problem.
- vi. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: testimony of the negotiators from 2021 through 2024 including Mr. Gregorio and Mr. Tan (from SSPAVI), their correspondence with Koren and his testimony, the NKM License agreement and the JVA and AJVA (none of which SPAAVI is a party to or conferred rights that SPAVI is responsible for. The absence of contractual

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privity or otherwise is what disproves this affirmative defense.

d. Causes of Action Barred by this Affirmative Defense: all of SPAVI's causes of action.

3) Affirmative Defense No. 3: Statute of Limitations. (asserted as to all of SPAVI's causes of action)

- a. Element No. 1: SPAVI (either independently or as successor-ininterest to Cinco) knew, should have known, or had constructive notice of PCJV USA Parties' alleged infringing conduct over three years before SPAVI filed this action.
 - i. The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual
 - iii. Defendant's Supporting Evidence: the following categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
 - iv. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Testimony off Mr. Gregorio (CEO of SPAVI) regarding termination of negotiations and sending the Termination Letter hours before this lawsuit was filed, such that, unless the statute of limitations is calculated by way of hours rather than years, this defense is an impossibility.
- b. Causes of Action Barred by this Affirmative Defense: all of SPAVI's causes of action.

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- 4) Affirmative Defense No. 4: Abandonment through Assignment in Gross.
 - a. Element No. 1: Cinco Corporation assigned U.S. Potato Corner trademarks to SPAVI without the goodwill associated with the trademarks.
 - i. The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual and Legal
 - iii. Defendants' Supporting Legal Position: Trademarks cannot be assigned or transferred apart from the goodwill of the business they represent. See Federal Treasury Enterprise Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Intern. N.V., 623 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 2010); Glow Industries, Inc. v. Lopez, 273 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Hallmark Hardwoods, Inv. V. Omni Wood Product, LLC, 2011 WL 13176098, *15 (C.D. Cal. 2011); In re Impact Distributors, Inc., 260 B.R. 48, 53-55 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1982).
 - iv. Plaintiff's Supporting Legal Position: this is a factual dispute. Plaintiff argues that it did receive goodwill, while Defendants argue that we did not.
 - v. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: the following category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
 - vi. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: the deeds filed with the USPTO, proof of intent to continue using the marks,, including plans to expand rapidly within the US (testimony of SPAVI executives charged with this expansion, including Mr. Gregorio, Mr. Tann, and Mr. Concepcion, the COO.)

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b. Causes of Action Barred by this Affirmative Defense: SPAVI's causes of action for Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114), Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), False Designation of Origin and Description of Fact (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), Contributory Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114), Contributory Trademark and False Designation of Fact (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), Common Law Trademark Infringement, Declaratory Relief and Unfair Competition (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200).

5) Affirmative Defense No. 5: Abandonment through Naked Licensing.

- a. Element No. 1: SPAVI Parties (including Cinco's) alleged licensed use of U.S. Potato Corner trademarks to PCJV USA Parties.
 - i. This element is disputed.
 - ii. Nature of the dispute: Legal
 - iii. Defendants' Position Statement: Defendants assert both ownership and use rights arising from naked licensing, i.e., authorization to use without adequate control. Ownership arises from Cinco Corporation's naked license because it barred the sale of any trademark rights to Plaintiff, and the PCJV USA Parties acquired all of Cinco Corporation's Interests and rights in Potato Corner in the United States in their settlement and MIPA. Ownership also arises from Plaintiff's naked licensing because PCJV USA, LLC is a senior user of the mark, including because Plaintiff never had any right to control Potato Corner in the United States, did not exercise control over Potato Corner in the United States, and had no grounds to believe PCJV USA, LLC would listen to or take any instruction from SPAVI.
 - iv. Plaintiff's Supporting Legal Position: the wording of this element, however, is going to be confusing to a jury. If it is

PCJV's position that it was not even a licensee as of May 31, 1 2 2024, the damages calculation will change considerably. b. Element No. 2: SPAVI Parties (including Cinco) did not exercise 3 4 adequate control over PCJV USA Parties' use of U.S. Potato Corner 5 trademarks. 6 i. The parties dispute that this element is satisfied. 7 ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual and Legal. iii. Defendant's Supporting Legal Position: 8 iv. Plaintiff's Supporting Legal Position: First, this is an incorrect 9 statement of the law, as the focus is less so on the use of the 10 Marks, but more so on the nature and quality of the goods and/or 11 services sold by the licensee. Second, though unsatisfying in its 12 failure to conclusively resolve the debate, in the Ninth Circuit 13 this defense likely requires a showing of clear and convincing 14 evidence. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 15 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010) 16 17 v. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: the following categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting 18 evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative 19 Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), 20 Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA 21 22 Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court 23 24 Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious 25 26 Conduct 27 vi. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Pursuant to the three considerations as to whether naked licensing has occurred, as 28

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summarized in F19 Franchising, LLC v. Endo Fitness LL, LLC, No. 2:23-CV-00185-MEMF-JCX, 2023 WL 11950376, at *6–9 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2023), this is the one issue for trial in which the prior action is actually relevant,, as it sets forth that efforts to exert control, as do the prior correspondence between Cinco and PCJV, and, moreover, the course of dealing prior to termination establishes the attempts to get control.

c. Causes of Action Barred by this Affirmative Defense: SPAVI's causes of action for Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114), Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), False Designation of Origin and Description of Fact (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), Contributory Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114), Contributory Trademark and False Designation of Fact (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), Common Law Trademark Infringement, Declaratory Relief and Unfair Competition (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200).

6) <u>Affirmative Defense No. 6: Senior Use.</u>

- a. <u>Element No. 1</u>: Defendants were the first to use the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks in the United States.
 - i. The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual.
 - iii. <u>Defendant's Legal Position Statement:</u> "The first to use a mark in an area is deemed the 'senior' user and has the right to enjoin 'junior users from using confusing similar marks in the same industry or market or within the senior user's natural zone of expansion." *Optimal Pets, Inc. v. Nutri-Vet, LLC*, 877 F. Supp. 953, 959 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
 - iv. Plaintiff's Legal Position Statement: See 15 USC § 1055. This argument is not made in good faith. It is also law of the case.

1	v. Defendants' Supporting Evidence:
2	vi. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Registrations and testimony of
3	Koren and Mr. Magsaysay
4	b. Element No. 2: SPAVI intends to use the U.S. Potato Corner
5	trademarks in the United States.
6	i. The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
7	ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual.
8	iii. <u>Defendants' Legal Position Statement:</u> "The first to use a mark
9	in an area is deemed the 'senior' user and has the right to enjoin
10	'junior users from using confusing similar marks in the same
11	industry or market or within the senior user's natural zone of
12	expansion." Optimal Pets, Inc. v. Nutri-Vet, LLC, 877 F. Supp.
13	953, 959 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
14	iv. Plaintiff's Legal Position Statement: Unclear what the dispute is
15	here other than factual.
16	v. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> the following categories,
17	which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting
18	evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative
19	Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012),
20	Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA
21	Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics
22	and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court
23	Proceedings (2018 and Beyond).
24	vi. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Testimony of Gregorio, Tan,
25	Concepcion, and Shaikh and Hussein
26	c. Causes of Action Barred by this Affirmative Defense: SPAVI's causes
27	of action for Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114), Trademark
28	Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), False Designation of Origin and

Description of Fact (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), Contributory Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114), Contributory Trademark and False Designation of Fact (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), Common Law Trademark Infringement, Declaratory Relief and Unfair Competition (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200).

- 7) Affirmative Defense No. 7: Continuous Prior Use Within Remote Geographic Area.
 - a. <u>Element No. 1</u>: Defendants continuously used the trademark, without interruption, in the U.S.
 - i. The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual.
 - iii. Defendants' Supporting Legal Position: (1) PCJV USA, LLC's is the senior use under Sengoku, including actual first use (restructure in 2009) and lawful first use, see CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Services, Inc., 474 F3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2007);
 (2) but for a license agreement, which SPAVI Parties disavow, PCJV USA, LLC's use inured to its own benefit; (3) Cinco Corporation did not control PCJV USA, LLC's use of the Potato Corner marks; and (4) SPAVI Parties did not control PCJV USA, LLC's use of the Potato Corner marks.
 - iv. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Legal Position:</u> See115 USC §1055. This argument is not made in good faith.
 - v. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> the following categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics

1	and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court
2	Proceedings (2018 and Beyond).
3	vi. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: All evidence presented in
4	Plaintiffs' case in chief will prove the defense of this.
5	b. Element No. 2: Defendants began using the trademark without
6	knowledge of SPAVI's prior use elsewhere.
7	i. Disputed Status of Element 2: The parties dispute that this
8	element is satisfied.
9	ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual.
10	iii. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> the following categories,
11	which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting
12	evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative
13	Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012),
14	Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA
15	Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics
16	and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court
17	Proceedings (2018 and Beyond).
18	iv. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Koren testimony, registrations.
19	c. <u>Element No. 3</u> : Defendants used the trademark before SPAVI
20	published the registered trademark.
21	i. Disputed Status of Element 3: The parties dispute that this
22	element is satisfied.
23	ii. Nature of Dispute: factual.
24	iii. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> the following categories,
25	which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting
26	evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative
27	Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012),
28	Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA

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- Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond).
- iv. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: 15 USC § 1055. This argument is not made in good faith
- d. Causes of Action Barred by this Affirmative Defense: SPAVI's causes of action for Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114), Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), False Designation of Origin and Description of Fact (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), Contributory Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114), Contributory Trademark and False Designation of Fact (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), Common Law Trademark Infringement, Declaratory Relief and Unfair Competition (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200).
- 8) Affirmative Defense No. 6: Mitigation.
 - a. Element No. 1: SPAVI failed to use reasonable efforts to mitigate alleged damages.
 - i. The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual.
 - iii. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: the following category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
 - iv. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Plaintiff looks forward to presenting the jury with every effort taken to get PCJV and Koren to either pay for or stop, finally, using this brand for which he has never paid to benefit from, whether that was negotiating a license, terminating the license or other attempts.
 - b. Element No. 2: the amount by which damages would have been mitigated.

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- i. The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
- ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual.
- iii. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> the following category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
- iv. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Testimony of Koren, Gregorio, Victor Tan, Financial documents.
- c. <u>Causes of Action Barred by this Affirmative Defense</u>: All of SPAVI Parties' causes of action (to the extent they seek damages).

9) Affirmative Defense No. 9: Senior Use Trademark Ownership

- a. <u>Element No. 1</u>: At the time of first lawful use, the partnership and JVA evidence co-ownership of the U.S. Potato Corner marks.
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 1: The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual.
 - iii. <u>Defendants' Position Statement:</u> The partnership and joint venture agreement between PCJV USA, LLC's LA Group and Cinco Group recognize and support per their terms and conditions that PCJV USA, LLC—the first actual, lawful, continuous and exclusive user of the U.S. Potato Corner marks—owns the U.S. Potato Corner marks (which was the LA Group's long-term security and consideration) at least until the parties executed the contemplated master license agreement (which was the Cinco Group's consideration) that they both agreed to enter into in accordance with their fiduciary and contractual obligations, but which still treated them as joint venture partners. *See Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int'l, Ltd.*, 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996); *cf. Precision Door Service, Inc.*

v. Bell, No. C 02–01108 CW, 2002 WL 655053, at *6 (N.D. Cal April 18, 2002). Given that Plaintiff is disavowing the license agreement—meaning the factual basis upon which PCJV USA, LLC's use might inure to Cinco Corporation's benefit did not happen—the operative coownership agreements favor Defendants or, at minimum, are not dispositive as to ownership. Plaintiff does not get ownership by default because all exclusive users under Sengoku are alleged "related companies." Under Sengoku, an alleged "related company" who is an exclusive user in the United States, gets to rebut that presumption, especially where, as here, the registrant filed an intent to use application that would only evidence senior use if the exclusive user's first actual and lawful use inured to its benefit. Under the partnership and joint venture agreement, which "vested" in the joint venture and exclusive user complete licensing rights and obligations in the United States, approval of franchise agreements, including as disclosed in FDDs, restrictions on transfer, payment of equal royalties and service fees, and lifetime rights to license and quality control over Potato Corner in the United States, it plainly supports ownership in the joint venture or, at minimum, is not dispositive. The jury is entitled to consider the following five factors used in the Ninth Circuit to help determine ownership as between PCJV USA, LLC, an exclusive domestic user, and Plaintiff, an assignee of a foreign registrant, which plainly demonstrate that PCJV USA, LLC owns the U.S. marks unless and until there was a meeting of the minds on an enforceable license agreement: (1) which party invented and affixed the mark to the product; (2) which party's name appeared with the

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- trademark; (3) which party maintained the product's quality and uniformity; (4) which party does the public identify with the product and make complaints to; and (5) which party possesses the goodwill associated with the product.
- iv. Plaintiff's Position Statement: This misstates the Lanhan act and the rules of priority. See Yagu. And Sengoku,
- v. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: documents and testimony including and related to (1) DLA Piper's notification of Cinco Corporation's unlawful use of Potato Corner in the United States; (2) the State of California's Department of Business Oversight's Order sanctioning PCJV USA, LLC for Cinco Corporation's alleged prior use of Potato Corner in the United States; (3) the superseding and restructure agreement between Guy Koren and Jose Magsaysay vesting ownership of Potato Corner in their partnership; (4) the joint venture agreement vesting co-ownership of Potato Corner in the United States in PCJV USA, LLC; (5) control over Potato Corner in the United States being vested with and exercised by PCJV USA, LLC; (6) Potato Corner USA being affixed to Potato Corner in the United States; (7) consumer association of Potato Corner in the United States with PCJV USA, LLC, to whom complaints, if any, were lodged; (8) PCJV USA, LLC's creation, development and hold over the goodwill of Potato Corner in the United States for over a decade; (9) Cinco's lack of control of Potato Corner in the United States for over a decade; (10) Plaintiff's lack of control of Potato Corner in the United States after it allegedly acquired the U.S. trademarks and before it registered additional Potato

1	Corner trademarks; and (11) Plaintiff's suppression of evidence
2	relevant to ownership.
3	vi. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> The registration and Koren's
4	admissions regarding control
5	b. Element No. 2 (if Element No. 1 is not dispositive): The following
6	factors demonstrate PCJV USA, LLC owns the U.S. Potato Corner
7	Trademarks: (1) which party invented and affixed the mark to the
8	product; (2) which party's name appeared with the trademark; (3)
9	which party maintained the product's quality and uniformity; (4)
10	which party does the public identify with the product and make
11	complaints to; and (5) which party possesses the goodwill associated
12	with the product.
13	i. Disputed Status of Element 3: The parties dispute that this
14	element is satisfied.
15	ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual.
16	iii. <u>Defendants' Position Statement:</u> Defendants incorporate the
17	above legal position.
18	iv. <u>Plaintiff's Position Statement:</u> this is incomprehensible and not
19	made in good faith.
20	v. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> Defendants incorporate the
21	above legal position.
22	vi. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: this is incomprehensible and
23	not made in good faith.
24	II. Counterclaimants and Third Party Plaintiffs' ("PCJV USA Parties")
25	Causes of Action to be Tried by a Jury
26	1) Cause of Action No. 2: Inducing Breach of Contract
27	b. Element No. 1: there was a contract between any one of the PCJV
28	USA Parties, on the one hand, and any one of the Cinco parties

(inclusive of the "Cinco Group" and "PCI Group") or franchisees on the other hand.

- i. Disputed Status of Element 1: The parties dispute this element is satisfied.
- ii. Nature of Dispute: factual and legal
- iii. PCJV USA Parties Legal Position Statement: The term for PCJV USA, LLC's use of the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks "can be [i]mplied from the nature of the contract and circumstances surrounding it." See Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Emp. Union, Local 16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 725 (1968). The "initial effort of the court, in construing contracts of continuing performance of forbearance which contain no express term of duration, must always be that of implying a term of duration commensurate with the intentions of the parties" *Id.* at 727. Only when "the nature of the contract and the totality of the surrounding circumstances give no suggestion as to any ascertainable term . . . , the obligations under the contract shall be terminable at will by any party upon reasonable notice after such a reasonable time has elapsed." *Id.* Further, it is immaterial that SPAVI had full knowledge of the contracts' terms. See Jenni Rivera Enterprises, LLC v. Latin World Entertainment Holdings, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 5th 766, 783 (2019). Nor is SPAVI's belief about the legal significance of facts or belief that the parties' agreements are legally binding or has a different legal effect from what it is judicially held to have. See Little v. Amber Hotel Co., 202 Cal. App. 4th 280, 302 (2011).

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- Plaintiff's Position Statement: as drafted it is impossible to iv. know what the specific contract is that is at issue here. It has never been disclosed, and still undisclosed. Rather than jettison the claim or actually identify the contract, instead, Defendants' solution is to fudge with obtuse language in the jury instructions, designed to confuse everyone, including the jury: "there was a contract between any one of the PCJV Plaintiffs and any one of the Cinco parties." Indeed, the only contract that Cinco has been a party to with any of these Counterclaimants is the Settlement Agreement of the Prior Governance Action. There is no other written agreement between PCJV and Cinco, or between any other Counterclaimant and Cinco.
- PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following V. categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008– 2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), and Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance.
- SPAVI and Cinco Parties' Supporting Evidence: Each of the vi. agreements included in the trial exhibits and testimony of Mr. Magsaysay, Mr. Koren, and Ms. Victor – all of which will establish that none of the Counterclaimants – PCJV, PCIT, LA Group LLC, GK Capital, NKM, or Koren have

any contract to which Cinco has privity.

- c. <u>Element No. 2:</u> SPAVI knew of the contract.
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 2: The parties dispute this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual and legal.
 - iii. PCJV USA Parties Legal Position Statement: "the contract" refers to each and every applicable contract, including all written, oral, and/or implied-in-fact agreements between the "Cinco Group" and/or "PCI Group," on the one hand, and Cross-Complainants PCJV, PCI Trading, LA Group, GK Capital, NKM, and Koren, on the other hand, inclusive of the JVA/AJVA, LLC Agreement, license agreements, MSA (as restated, amended, modified, or appended over time through PCJV meeting minutes, written communications of the PCJV Board, and/or representations made in FDDs); (2) the Settlement Documents between the "Koren Parties" and "Cinco Parties"; and (3) the franchise agreements PCJV entered with franchisees. Plaintiff's position statement does not assert a legal argument
 - iv. SPAVI and Cinco's Position Statement: as drafted it is impossible to know what the specific contract is at issue here. It has never been disclosed, and still undisclosed. So, when this element in the instructions says, "the contract," whereas the prior element refers to some unidentified contract, as a matter of law, yes, this element is disputed. To the extent any actual contract ever existed between Cinco and these parties, the only one that is possible is the Settlement Agreement and corresponding agreement selling PCJV

equity to GKK Capital. (Trial Exhibit 1176.) Because Cinco has never been a party to any other contract with any of the Counterclaim Defendants, that is the only one that could possibly be at issue, but Defendants refuse to acknowledge this.

- v. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence</u>: the following category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
- vi. SPAVI and Cinco Parties' Supporting Evidence: Each of the agreements included in the trial exhibits and testimony of Mr. Gregorio, Mr. Tan, Ms. Victor, as well as Mr. Koren all of which will establish that were aware of no contract between none of the Counterclaimants PCJV, PCIT, LA Group LLC, GK Capital, NKM, or Koren have any contract to which Cinco has privity. After the fact, now, having been sued, SPAVI will unequivocally testify that it had knowledge of the terms off the settlement and never saw the document until this case commenced.
- d. <u>Element No. 3:</u> SPAVI intended to cause any one of the Cinco parties or franchisees to breach the contract
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 3: The parties dispute this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual and legal.
 - iii. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement:</u> Plaintiff's position statement does not address a legal issue concerning this element. To the extent Plaintiff's position statement addresses element 1, PCJV USA Parties incorporate their respective response here.

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iv.	Plaintiff's Position Statement: as drafted it is impossible to
1 V .	1 iaintiff 3 i osition Statement. as drafted it is impossible to
	know what the specific contract is at issue here. It has never
	been disclosed, and still undisclosed. So, when this element
	in the instructions says, "the contract," whereas the prior
	element refers to some unidentified contract, as a matter of
	law, yes, this element is disputed. To the extent any actual
	contract ever existed between Cinco and these parties, the
	only one that is possible is the Settlement Agreement and
	corresponding agreement selling PCJV equity to GKK
	Capital. (Trial Exhibit 1176.) Because Cinco has never been
	a party to any other contract with any of the Counterclaim
	Defendants, that is the only one that could possibly be at
	issue, but Defendants refuse to acknowledge this.

- PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following V. category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
- SPAVI's Supporting Evidence: Each of the agreements vi. included in the trial exhibits and testimony of Mr. Gregorio, Mr. Tan, Ms. Victor, as well as Mr. Koren – all of which will establish that they were not aware of and had no intent to cause anyone to breach any contract. Also, the correspondence leading up to the termination of the license – Trial Exhibits 20-31 – also confirm the intent was to negotiate a license with PCJV, something for which years were spent in pursuit, to no avail.
- e. Element No. 4: SPAVI's conduct caused any one of the Cinco parties to breach the contract
 - Disputed Status of Element 4: The parties dispute this

element is satisfied.

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- ii. Nature of Dispute: factual and legal.
- iii. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Legal Position: The term for PCJV USA, LLC's use of the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks "can be [i]mplied from the nature of the contract and circumstances surrounding it." See Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Emp. Union, Local 16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 725 (1968). The "initial effort of the court, in construing contracts of continuing performance of forebearance which contain no express term of duration, must always be that of implying a term of duration commensurate with the intentions of the parties" Id. at 727. Only when "the nature of the contract and the totality of the surrounding circumstances give no suggestion as to any ascertainable term . . . , the obligations under the contract shall be terminable at will by any party upon reasonable notice after such a reasonable time has elapsed." *Id.* Further, it is immaterial that SPAVI had full knowledge of the contracts' terms. See Jenni Rivera Enterprises, LLC v. Latin World Entertainment Holdings, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 5th 766, 783 (2019). Nor is SPAVI's belief about the legal significance of facts or belief that the parties' agreements are legally binding or has a different legal effect from what it is judicially held to have. See Little v. Amber Hotel Co., 202 Cal. App. 4th 280, 302 (2011).
- iv. <u>Plaintiff's Position Statement:</u> First, this presumes Cinco breached a contract. The only contracts that have been identified as being "breached" are the unsigned licensee

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agreement and the AJVA. Neither document binds Cinco –
indeed, that the AJVA constitutes an agreement to agree and
not a contract has already been adjudicated and decided as
law of the case. It is impossible to know what the specific
contract is at issue here. To the extent any actual contract
ever existed between Cinco and these parties, the only one
that is possible is the Settlement Agreement and
corresponding agreement selling PCJV equity to GKK
Capital. (Trial Exhibit 1176.) Because Cinco has never been
a party to any other contract with any of the Counterclaim
Defendants, that is the only one that could possibly be at
issue, but Defendants refuse to acknowledge this.

- PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following V. categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008– 2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
- SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence: The absence of vi. evidence that Cinco was a party to, or breached, any contract with any of the Counterclaimants is the supporting evidence.
- f. Element No. 5: any one of the PCJV USA Parties were harmed
 - Disputed Status of Element 4: The parties dispute this i.

vi. <u>SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence:</u> The absence of evidence that Cinco was a party to, or breached, any contract with any of the Counterclaimants is the supporting

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evidence, as there is no way any of the Counterclaimants could have been harmed.

- g. <u>Element No. 6:</u> SPAVI's conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to any of the Counterclaimants.
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 6: The parties dispute this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual and legal.
 - iii. PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement: Plaintiff's position statement does not address a legal issue concerning this element. To the extent Plaintiff's position statement addresses element 1, PCJV USA Parties incorporate their respective response here
 - Plaintiff's Position Statement: Again, this presumes Cinco iv. breached a contract. The only contracts that have been identified as being "breached" are the unsigned licensee agreement and the AJVA. Neither document binds Cinco – indeed, that the AJVA constitutes an agreement to agree and not a contract has already been adjudicated and decided as law of the case. It is impossible to know what the specific contract is at issue here. To the extent any actual contract ever existed between Cinco and these parties, the only one that is possible is the Settlement Agreement and corresponding agreement selling PCJV equity to GKK Capital. (Trial Exhibit 1176.) Because Cinco has never been a party to any other contract with any of the Counterclaim Defendants, that is the only one that could possibly be at issue, but Defendants refuse to acknowledge this.
 - v. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence:</u> the following

categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.

vi. SPAVI and Cinco's Supporting Evidence: SPAVI's only act that could have caused "harm" to any of the Counterclaimants is termination of the license, which it was permitted to do. The absence of evidence that Cinco was a party to, or breached, any contract with any of the Counterclaimants is the supporting evidence, as there is no way any of the Counterclaimants could have been harmed let alone as a result of any act by SPAVI.

2) <u>Cause of Action No. 3: Intentional Interference with Contractual</u> Relations.

- a. <u>Element No. 1</u>: there were various contracts, including contracts with the Cinco parties, franchisees, suppliers, and vendors,
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 1: The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual
 - iii. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Legal Position:</u> The term for PCJV USA, LLC's use of the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks "can be [i]mplied from the nature of the contract and circumstances surrounding it." *See Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical*

Stage Emp. Union, Local 16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 725 (1968). The "initial effort of the court, in construing contracts of continuing performance of forbearance which contain no express term of duration, must always be that of implying a term of duration commensurate with the intentions of the parties" Id. at 727. Only when "the nature of the contract and the totality of the surrounding circumstances give no suggestion as to any ascertainable term . . . , the obligations under the contract shall be terminable at will by any party upon reasonable notice after such a reasonable time has elapsed." *Id.* Further, it is immaterial that SPAVI had full knowledge of the contracts' terms. See Jenni Rivera Enterprises, LLC v. Latin World Entertainment Holdings, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 5th 766, 783 (2019). Nor is SPAVI's belief about the legal significance of facts or belief that the parties' agreements are legally binding or has a different legal effect from what it is judicially held to have. See Little v. Amber Hotel Co., 202 Cal. App. 4th 280, 302 (2011).

Plaintiff's Supporting Legal Position: The only contracts that vii. have been identified as being "breached" are the unsigned licensee agreement and the AJVA. Neither document binds Cinco – indeed, that the AJVA constitutes an agreement to agree and not a contract has already been adjudicated and decided as law of the case. It is impossible to know what the specific contract is at issue here. To the extent any actual contract ever existed between Cinco and these parties, the only one that is possible is the Settlement Agreement and corresponding agreement selling PCJV equity to GKK

- Capital. (Trial Exhibit 1176.) Because Cinco has never been a party to any other contract with any of the Counterclaim Defendants, that is the only one that could possibly be at issue, but Defendants refuse to acknowledge this.
- iv. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), and Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance.
 - v. <u>SPAVI and Cinco's Supporting Evidence:</u> the absence of evidence is enough. There are no such contracts
- b. Element No. 2: SPAVI knew of the contracts.
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 2: The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - i. Nature of Dispute: Factual.
 - ii. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence:</u> the following category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
 - iii. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> the absence of evidence is enough. There are no such contracts.
- c. <u>Element No. 3</u>: SPAVI's <u>conduct prevented</u> performance or made performance more expensive or difficult.
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 3: The parties dispute that this

Disputed Status of Element 5: The parties dispute that this

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1	element is satisfied.	
2	ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual.	
3	iii. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence:	
4	iv. SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence: the absence of evidence	
5	is enough. There are no such contracts.	
6	f. Element No. 6: SPAVI's conduct was a substantial factor in causing	
7	any one of the PCJV USA Parties' harm.	
8	i. Disputed Status of Element 6: The parties dispute that this	
9	element is satisfied.	
10	ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual.	
11	iii. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence:	
12	iv. SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence: the absence of evidence	
13	is enough. There are no such contracts	
14	3) Cause of Action No. 4: Interference with Prospective Economic	
15	Relations.	
16	a. Element No. 1: any one of the PCJV USA Parties were in various	
17	economic relations, including with Cinco parties, franchisees,	
18	suppliers, and venders were in that probably would have resulted in an	
19	economic benefit to Defendants.	
20	i. Disputed Status of Element 1: The parties dispute that this	
21	element is satisfied.	
22	ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual.	
23	iii. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Legal Position: The term for	
24	PCJV USA, LLC's use of the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks	
25	"can be [i]mplied from the nature of the contract and	
26	circumstances surrounding it." See Consolidated Theatres,	
27	Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Emp. Union, Local 16, 69 Cal.2d 713,	
28	725 (1968). The "initial effort of the court, in construing	

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contracts of continuing performance of forebearance which
contain no express term of duration, must always be that of
implying a term of duration commensurate with the intentions
of the parties" <i>Id.</i> at 727. Only when "the nature of the
contract and the totality of the surrounding circumstances give
no suggestion as to any ascertainable term , the obligations
under the contract shall be terminable at will by any party
upon reasonable notice after such a reasonable time has
elapsed." Id. Further, it is immaterial that SPAVI had full
knowledge of the contracts' terms. See Jenni Rivera
Enterprises, LLC v. Latin World Entertainment Holdings, Inc.
36 Cal. App. 5th 766, 783 (2019). Nor is SPAVI's belief abou
the legal significance of facts or belief that the parties'
agreements are legally binding or has a different legal effect
from what it is judicially held to have. See Little v. Amber
Hotel Co., 202 Cal. App. 4th 280, 302 (2011).
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- iv. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Legal Position:</u> the only relationships SPAVI knew about were with franchisees and certain vendors. the specific relationships at issue here have never been disclosed.
- PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following v. categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008– 2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and

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- b. Element No. 2: SPAVI knew of the relationships.
 - Disputed Status of Element 2: The parties dispute that this i. element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual.
 - PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following iii. category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
 - SPAVI's Supporting Evidence: testimony of executives iv.
- c. Element No. 3: SPAVI engaged in conduct to destroy the value of any one of the PCJV USA Parties' relationships by usurping the benefits of those relationships for SPAVI's benefit.
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 3: The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual.
 - PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following iii. category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
 - SPAVI's Supporting Evidence: Testimony of Tan and iv. Concepcion and Victor and Shaikh and Hussein will all support SPAVI here.
- d. Element No. 4: by engaging in this conduct, SPAVI either (a) intended to disrupt the relationships or (b) knew that disruption of the relationships was certain or substantially certain to occur.
 - Disputed Status of Element 4: The parties dispute that this i. element is satisfied.

1	ii.	Nature of Dispute: Factual.
2	iii.	PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
3		category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and
4		supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
5	iv.	SPAVI's Supporting Evidence: Tan and Concepcion and
6		Victor and Shaikh and Hussein will all support SPAVI here.
7	e. Elemen	nt No. 5: those relationships were disrupted.
8	i.	Disputed Status of Element 5: The parties dispute that this
9		element is satisfied.
10	ii.	Nature of Dispute: Factual.
11	iii.	PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
12		categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases
13		and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–
14		2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing
15		Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of
16		the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement
17		and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018),
18		Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and
19		Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory
20		Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
21	iv.	SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence: it is unknown what
22		relationships were disrupted.
23	f. Elemen	nt No. 6: any one of the PCJV USA Parties were harmed.
24	i.	Disputed Status of Element 6: The parties dispute that this
25		element is satisfied.
26	ii.	Nature of Dispute: Factual.
27	iii.	PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
28		category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and

1	supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduc	t.
2	iv. <u>SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence:</u> no proof of this	has ever
3	been established, particularly harm caused by any of the	ne
4	responding parties.	
5	g. Element No. 7: SPAVI's conduct was a substantial factor in ca	using
6	any one of the PCJV USA Parties' harm.	
7	i. Disputed Status of Element 7: The parties dispute that	this
8	element is satisfied.	
9	ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual.	
10	iii. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following	ıg
11	category, which is defined above, captures the key pha	se and
12	supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduc	t.
13	iv. <u>SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence:</u> no proof of this	has ever
14	been established, particularly harm caused by any of the	ne
15	responding parties.	
16	4) Cause of Action No. 5: Negligent Interference with Prospectiv	e
17	Economic Advantage.	
18	a. <u>Element No. 1</u> : any one of the PCJV USA Parties were in varie	ous
19	economic relations, including with Cinco parties, franchisees,	
20	suppliers, and venders that probably would have resulted in a future	
21	economic benefit to any one of the PCJV USA Parties.	
22	i. Disputed Status of Element 1: The parties dispute that	this
23	element is satisfied.	
24	ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual.	
25	iii. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Legal Position: The ter	rm for
26	PCJV USA, LLC's use of the U.S. Potato Corner trade	marks
27	"can be [i]mplied from the nature of the contract and	
28	circumstances surrounding it." See Consolidated Thea	ıtres,
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Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Emp. Union, Local 16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 725 (1968). The "initial effort of the court, in construing contracts of continuing performance of forebearance which contain no express term of duration, must always be that of implying a term of duration commensurate with the intentions of the parties" *Id.* at 727. Only when "the nature of the contract and the totality of the surrounding circumstances give no suggestion as to any ascertainable term . . . , the obligations under the contract shall be terminable at will by any party upon reasonable notice after such a reasonable time has elapsed." *Id.* Further, it is immaterial that SPAVI had full knowledge of the contracts' terms. See Jenni Rivera Enterprises, LLC v. Latin World Entertainment Holdings, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 5th 766, 783 (2019). Nor is SPAVI's belief about the legal significance of facts or belief that the parties' agreements are legally binding or has a different legal effect from what it is judicially held to have. See Little v. Amber Hotel Co., 202 Cal. App. 4th 280, 302 (2011).

- vii. Plaintiff's Supporting Legal Position: the only relationships SPAVI knew about were with franchisees and certain vendors. the specific relationships at issue here have never been disclosed.
- PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: documents and iv. testimony including and related to prospective supplier economic relationships and franchisee relations. the following categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008– 2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing

1		Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of
2		the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement
3		and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018),
4		Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and
5		Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory
6		Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
7	V.	SPAVI's Supporting Evidence: testimony of executives.
8	b. Elemen	nt No. 2: SPAVI knew or should have known of these
9	relation	nships.
10	i.	Disputed Status of Element 2: The parties dispute that this
11		element is satisfied.
12	ii.	Nature of Dispute: Factual.
13	iii.	PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
14		category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and
15		supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
16	iv.	SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence: testimony of executives
17	c. Elemen	nt No. 3: SPAVI knew or should have known that these
18	relation	nships would be disrupted if it failed to act with reasonable care.
19	i.	Disputed Status of Element 3: The parties dispute that this
20		element is satisfied.
21	ii.	Nature of Dispute: Factual.
22	iii.	PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
23		category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and
24		supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
25	iv.	SPAVI's Supporting Evidence: Testimony of Tan and
26		Concepcion and Victor and Shaikh and Hussein will all
27		support SPAVI here
28	d. Elemen	nt No. 4: SPAVI failed to act with reasonable care.

1	i.	Disputed Status of Element 4: The parties dispute that this
2		element is satisfied.
3	ii.	Nature of Dispute: Factual.
4	iii.	PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
5		category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and
6		supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
7	iv.	SPAVI's Supporting Evidence: Tan and Concepcion and
8		Victor and Shaikh and Hussein will all support SPAVI here
9	e. <u>Eleme</u>	nt No. 5: SPAVI engaged in wrongful conduct through engaging
10	in cond	duct to destroy the value of any one of the PCJV USA Parties'
11	relation	nships by usurping the benefits of those relationships for
12	SPAV	I's benefit.
13	i.	Disputed Status of Element 5: The parties dispute that this
14		element is satisfied.
15	ii.	Nature of Dispute: Factual.
16	iii.	PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
17		categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases
18		and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–
19		2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing
20		Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of
21		the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement
22		and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018),
23		Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and
24		Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory
25		Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
26	iv.	SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence: Tan and Concepcion
27		and Victor and Shaikh and Hussein will all support SPAVI
28		here
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1	f. Element No.	6: the relationships were disrupted.
2	i. Dispu	ated Status of Element 6: The parties dispute that this
3	eleme	ent is satisfied.
4	ii. Natur	re of Dispute: Factual.
5	iii. <u>PCJV</u>	USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
6	categ	ory, which is defined above, captures the key phase and
7	suppo	orting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
8	iv. <u>SPA</u>	VI Parties' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI is unaware of
9	what	relationships were harmed.
10	g. Element No.	7: any one of the PCJV USA Parties were harmed.
11	i. Dispu	ated Status of Element 7: The parties dispute that this
12	eleme	ent is satisfied.
13	ii. Natu	re of Dispute: Factual.
14	iii. <u>PCJV</u>	USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
15	categ	ory, which is defined above, captures the key phase and
16	suppo	orting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
17	i. <u>SPA</u>	VI Parties' Supporting Evidence: no proof of this has ever
18	been	established, particularly harm caused by any of the
19	respo	nding parties
20	h. Element No.	8: SPAVI's wrongful conduct was a substantial factor in
21	causing Defe	ndants' harm.
22	i. Dispu	ated Status of Element 8: The parties dispute that this
23	eleme	ent is satisfied.
24	ii. Natu	re of Dispute: Factual.
25	iii. <u>PCJV</u>	USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
26	categ	ory, which is defined above, captures the key phase and
27	suppo	orting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
28	iv. <u>SPA</u>	VI's Supporting Evidence: no proof of this has ever been

1	established, particularly harm caused by any of the responding
2	parties.
3	5) Cause of Action No. 6: Aiding and Abetting Torts.
4	a. Element No. 1: SPAVI knew that a breach of a fiduciary duty, breach
5	of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, or
6	conversion was going to be committed by Cinco Corporation, its
7	affiliates, or its agents against any one of the PCJV USA Parties.
8	i. Disputed Status of Element 1: The parties dispute that this
9	element is satisfied.
10	ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual.
11	iii. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
12	categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases
13	and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–
14	2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing
15	Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of
16	the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement
17	and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018),
18	Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and
19	Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory
20	Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct
21	iv. SPAVI's Supporting Evidence: no torts have occurred so
22	nothing could be aided or abetted.
23	b. Element No. 2: SPAVI gave substantial assistance or encouragement
24	to Cinco Corporation, its affiliates, or its agents.
25	v. Disputed Status of Element 2: The parties dispute that this
26	element is satisfied.
27	vi. Nature of Dispute: Factual.
28	vii. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following

1	category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and
2	supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
3	viii. SPAVI's Supporting Evidence: no torts have occurred so
4	nothing could be aided or abetted.
5	c. Element No. 3: Cinco Corporation's, its affiliates, or tis agents'
6	conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to any one of the
7	PCJV USA Parties.
8	ix. Disputed Status of Element 3: The parties dispute that this
9	element is satisfied.
10	x. Nature of Dispute: Factual.
11	xi. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence:</u> the following
12	category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and
13	supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
14	xii. <u>SPAVI's Supporting Evidence:</u> no torts have occurred so
15	nothing could be aided or abetted.
16	6) Cause of Action No. 7: First Count of Breach of Fiduciary Duty.
17	a. Element No. 1: either Cinco Corporation or SPAVI, as Cinco
18	Corporation's successor-in-interest, was a joint venture partner of
19	PCJV.
20	i. Disputed Status of Element 1: The parties dispute that this
21	element is satisfied.
22	ii. Nature of Dispute: Factual.
23	iii. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence:
24	iv. <u>SPAVI and Cinco's Supporting Evidence:</u> the absence of
25	evidence will suffice. Also, no evidence that SPAVI is a
26	successor in interest or took on this liability
27	b. <u>Element No. 2</u> : Cinco Corporation or SPAVI, as Cinco Corporation's

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the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement
and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018),
Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and
Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory
Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct

- SPAVI and Cinco's Supporting Evidence: the absence of iv. evidence of a duty will suffice. Also, no evidence that SPAVI is a successor in interest or took on this liability
- d. Element No. 4: any one of the PCJV USA Parties were harmed.
 - Disputed Status of Element 4: The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual
 - iii. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
 - SPAVI and Cinco's Supporting Evidence: the absence of iv. evidence of a duty will suffice. Also, no evidence that SPAVI is a successor in interest or took on this liability
- e. Element No. 5: the conduct of Cinco Corporation or SPAVI, as Cinco Corporation's successor-in-interest, was a substantial factor in causing any one of the PCJV USA Parties' harm.
 - Disputed Status of Element 5: The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual
 - iii. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct

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iv.	SPAVI and Cinco's Supporting Evidence: the absence of
	evidence of a duty will suffice. Also, no evidence that SPAVI
	is a successor in interest or took on this liability

7) Cause of Action No. 7: Second Count of Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

- a. Element No. 1: Cinco Corporation or SPAVI, as Cinco Corporation's successor-in-interest, was a joint venture partner of PCJV.
 - Disputed Status of Element 1: The parties dispute that this i. element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual
 - PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: [insert] iii.
 - iv. SPAVI and Cinco's Supporting Evidence: the absence of evidence of a duty will suffice. Also, no evidence that SPAVI is a successor in interest or took on this liability
- b. Element No. 2: Cinco Corporation or SPAVI, as Cinco Corporation's successor-in-interest, knowingly acted against interests of PCJV and PCJV's other joint venture partners in connection with providing PCJV with an exclusive right to use the Potato Corner trademark in the United States.
 - Disputed Status of Element 2: The parties dispute that this element is satisfied.
 - Nature of Dispute: Factual ii.
 - PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following iii. categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008– 2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018),

1		Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and
2		Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory
3		Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct
4	iv.	SPAVI and Cinco's Supporting Evidence: the absence of
5		evidence of a duty will suffice. Also, no evidence that SPAVI
6		is a successor in interest or took on this liability
7	c. Elemen	t No. 3: any one of the PCJV USA Parties did not give
8	informe	ed consent to the conduct of Cinco Corporation or SPAVI, as
9		Corporation's successor-in-interest.
10	i.	Disputed Status of Element 3: The parties dispute that this
11		element is satisfied.
12	ii.	Nature of Dispute: Factual
13	iii.	PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
14		categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases
15		and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–
16		2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing
17		Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of
18		the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement
19		and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018),
20		Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and
21		Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory
22		Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
23	iv.	SPAVI and Cinco's Supporting Evidence: the absence of
24		evidence of a duty will suffice. Also, no evidence that SPAVI
25		is a successor in interest or took on this liability
26	d. <u>Elemen</u>	t No. 4: any one of the PCJV USA Parties were harmed,
27	i.	Disputed Status of Element 4: The parties dispute that this
28		element is satisfied.

1	ii.	Nature of Dispute: Factual.
2	iii.	PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
3		category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and
4		supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
5	iv.	SPAVI and Cinco's Supporting Evidence: the absence of
6		evidence of a duty will suffice. Also, no evidence that SPAVI
7		is a successor in interest or took on this liability
8	e. <u>Elemer</u>	at No. 5: the conduct of Cinco Corporation or SPAVI, as Cinco
9	Corpor	ation's successor-in-interest, was a substantial factor in causing
10	any one	e of the PCJV USA Parties' harm.
11	i.	Disputed Status of Element 5: The parties dispute that this
12		element is satisfied.
13	ii.	Nature of Dispute: factual
14	iii.	PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following
15		category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and
16		supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct
17	iv.	SPAVI and Cinco's Supporting Evidence: the absence of
18		evidence of a duty will suffice. Also, no evidence that SPAVI
19		is a successor in interest or took on this liability
20	8) Cause of A	Action No. 7: Breach of Contract.
21	a. Elemen	at No. 1: there is a contract between PCJV and Cinco
22	Corpor	ation or SPAVI, as Cinco Corporation's successor-in-interest.
23	i.	Disputed Status of Element 1: The parties dispute this
24		element is satisfied.
25	ii.	Nature of Dispute: factual and legal
26	iii.	PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement: The term for PCJV
27		USA, LLC's use of the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks "can
28		be [i]mplied from the nature of the contract and
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circumstances surrounding it." See Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Emp. Union, Local 16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 725 (1968). The "initial effort of the court, in construing contracts of continuing performance of forebearance which contain no express term of duration, must always be that of implying a term of duration commensurate with the intentions of the parties " *Id.* at 727. Only when "the nature of the contract and the totality of the surrounding circumstances give no suggestion as to any ascertainable term . . . , the obligations under the contract shall be terminable at will by any party upon reasonable notice after such a reasonable time has elapsed." *Id.* Further, it is immaterial that SPAVI had full knowledge of the contracts' terms. See Jenni Rivera Enterprises, LLC v. Latin World Entertainment Holdings, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 5th 766, 783 (2019). Nor is SPAVI's belief about the legal significance of facts or belief that the parties' agreements are legally binding or has a different legal effect from what it is judicially held to have. See Little v. Amber Hotel Co., 202 Cal. App. 4th 280, 302 (2011)

iv. <u>Plaintiff's Position Statement:</u> as drafted it is impossible to know what the specific contract is that is at issue here. It has never been disclosed, and still undisclosed. Rather than jettison the claim or actually identify the contract, instead, Defendants' solution is to fudge with obtuse language in the jury instructions, designed to confuse everyone, including the jury: "there was a contract between any one of the PCJV Plaintiffs and any one of the Cinco parties." Indeed, the only

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contract that Cinco has been a party to with any of these Counterclaimants is the Settlement Agreement of the Prior Governance Action. There is no other written agreement between PCJV and Cinco, or between any other Counterclaimant and Cinco. It is possible that Counterclaimants are seeking to allege that Cinco is an alter ego of Potato Corner International or others, however, PCJV and the other counterclaimants already alleged this -alt3er ego status of Cinco -- and after a negotiated settlement, dismissed this claim with prejudice. They may not raise it now. See, e.g., Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Ct., 216 Cal. App. 3d 813, 820 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that ""a dismissal with prejudice is the maiden name for a common law retraxit," and "[a] retraxit is equivalent to a judgment on the merits and as such bars further litigation on the same subject matter between the parties."); Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal. App. 2d 613, 620—21 (1959) ("The effect of a dismissal" with prejudice is quite different, however, when it is executed and filed in return for a consideration moving from the defendant. Such a dismissal operates as a complete bar to any future action and has the same legal effect as a common law petraxit.").

v. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> the following categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement

- and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), and Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance.
- vi. SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence: Each of the agreements included in the trial exhibits and testimony of Mr. Magsaysay, Mr. Koren, and Ms. Victor all of which will establish that none of the Counterclaimants PCJV, PCIT, LA Group LLC, GK Capital, NKM, or Koren have any contract to which Cinco has privity; the settlement agreement (Trial Exhibit 1172) and evidence of the dismissals with prejudice, as well as the pleadings in the prior case establishing what has been dismissed, and subject to retraxit.
- b. <u>Element No. 2:</u> PCJV USA Parties did all or substantially all of the things required under the contract, or were excused from so performing:
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 2: The parties dispute this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual and legal.
 - iii. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement:</u> Plaintiff's position statement does not address a legal issue concerning this element. To the extent Plaintiff's position statement addresses element 1, PCJV USA Parties incorporate their respective response here
 - iv. <u>Plaintiff's Position Statement:</u> as drafted it is impossible to know what the specific contract is at issue here. It has never been disclosed, and still undisclosed. So, when this element

in the instructions says, "the contract," whereas the prior element refers to some unidentified contract, as a matter of law, yes, this element is disputed. To the extent any actual contract ever existed between Cinco and these parties, the only one that is possible is the Settlement Agreement and corresponding agreement selling PCJV equity to GKK Capital. (Trial Exhibit 1176.) Because Cinco has never been a party to any other contract with any of the Counterclaim Defendants, that is the only one that could possibly be at issue, but Defendants refuse to acknowledge this. It is possible that Counterclaimants are seeking to allege that Cinco is an alter ego of Potato Corner International or others, however, PCJV and the other counterclaimants already alleged this -- alter ego status of Cinco -- and after a negotiated settlement, dismissed this claim with prejudice. They may not raise it now. See, e.g., Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Ct., 216 Cal. App. 3d 813, 820 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that "a dismissal with prejudice is the maiden name fir a common law retraxit," and "[a] retraxit is equivalent to a judgment on the merits and as such bars further litigation on the same subject matter between the parties."); Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal. App. 2d 613, 620—21 (1959) ("The effect of a dismissal with prejudice is quite different, however, when it is executed and filed in return for a consideration moving from the defendant. Such a dismissal operates as a complete bar to any future action and has the same legal effect as a common law petraxit.") (internal

categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), and Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance.

- vi. SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence: Each of the agreements included in the trial exhibits and testimony of Mr. Magsaysay, Mr. Koren, and Ms. Victor all of which will establish that none of the Counterclaimants PCJV, PCIT, LA Group LLC, GK Capital, NKM, or Koren have any contract to which Cinco has privity; the settlement agreement (Trial Exhibit 1172) and evidence of the dismissals with prejudice, as well as the pleadings in the prior case establishing what has been dismissed, and subject to retraxit..
- c. Element No. 3: Cinco Corporation or SPAVI, as Cinco Corporation's successor-in-interest, breached the contract
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 3: The parties dispute this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual and legal.
 - iii. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement:</u> SPAVI intended to cause the breach of the above listed contracts by: (1) allegedly acquiring IP rights from Cinco (which SPAVI claims include US IP rights), without LA

Group's/Koren's/PCJV's prior written consent in violation of the JVA/AJVA/LLC Agreement; (2) failing to allegedly acquire the associated obligations and burdens under those agreements to, for example, acknowledge our use and termination rights, make best efforts to cooperate for the success of PCJV, to perform further acts (such as execute and deliver all required documents), if necessary, to provide us use rights, or to, at minimum, acknowledge that PCJV maintains a 50-year license or at least may continue to use for as long as necessary under the franchise agreements it was authorized to sign with franchisees in violation of the JVA/AJVA/LLC Agreement/license agreements/MSA (and associated written, oral, implied-in-fact agreements/modifications, such as meeting minutes, written communications of the PCJV members/managers, FDDs); (3) refusing to acknowledge PCJV's right to reverse engineer the powders/spices in violation of the PCJV board meeting minutes; (4) refusing to acknowledge PCJV's affiliated Koren stores' right not to pay royalties in accordance with the JVA/AJVA/LLC Agreement; (5) refusing to acknowledge LA Group's and Cinco Group/PCI Group's mutual waiver of royalties as to all other initial/franchise fees or other royalty income actually collected or to be collected by PCJV in accordance with the JVA/AJVA/LLC Agreement/FDDs; (6) refusing to honor the settlement struck with Cinco whereby Koren/GK acquired all interests and attached interests (despite representing that it would); and (7) causing certain PCJV franchisees to breach their franchise

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1 agreements and associate themselves with SPAVI.

- Plaintiff's Position Statement: The only contracts that have iv. been identified as being "breached" are the unsigned licensee agreement and the AJVA. Neither document binds Cinco – indeed, that the AJVA constitutes an agreement to agree and not a contract has already been adjudicated and decided as law of the case. It is impossible to know what the specific contract is at issue here. To the extent any actual contract ever existed between Cinco and these parties, the only one that is possible is the Settlement Agreement and corresponding agreement selling PCJV equity to GKK Capital. (Trial Exhibit 1176.) Because Cinco has never been a party to any other contract with any of the Counterclaim Defendants, that is the only one that could possibly be at issue, but Defendants refuse to acknowledge this.
- PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following V. categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008– 2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
- SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence: The absence of vi. evidence that Cinco was a party to, or breached, any contract with any of the Counterclaimants is the supporting

1		evidence.
2	d. <u>Elem</u>	ent No. 4: PCJV USA Parties were harmed.
3	i.	Disputed Status of Element 4: The parties dispute this
4		element is satisfied.
5	ii.	Nature of Dispute: factual and legal.
6	iii.	Defendants' Position Statement: Plaintiff's position
7		statement does not address a legal issue concerning this
8		element. To the extent Plaintiff's position statement
9		addresses element 1, PCJV USA Parties incorporate their
10		respective response here.
11	iv.	Plaintiff's Position Statement: Cinco breached no contract.
12		The only contracts that have been identified as being
13		"breached" are the unsigned licensee agreement and the
14		AJVA. Neither document binds Cinco – indeed, that the
15		AJVA constitutes an agreement to agree and not a contract
16		has already been adjudicated and decided as law of the case.
17		It is impossible to know what the specific contract is at issue
18		here. To the extent any actual contract ever existed between
19		Cinco and these parties, the only one that is possible is the
20		Settlement Agreement and corresponding agreement selling
21		PCJV equity to GKK Capital. (Trial Exhibit 1176.) Because
22		Cinco has never been a party to any other contract with any
23		of the Counterclaim Defendants, that is the only one that
24		could possibly be at issue, but Defendants refuse to
25		acknowledge this.
26	V.	<u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> the following category,
27		which is defined above, captures the key phase and
28		supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
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vi. <u>SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence:</u> The absence of evidence that Cinco was a party to, or breached, any contract with any of the Counterclaimants is the supporting evidence, as there is no way any of the Counterclaimants could have been harmed.

9) Cause of Action No. 9: Breach of Covenant oof Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

- e. Element No. 1: there is a contract between a Counterclaimant and Cinco Corporation / that SPAVI is a successor in interest to a contract with Cinco.
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 1: The parties dispute this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual and legal
 - <u>PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement:</u> The term for PCJV iii. USA, LLC's use of the U.S. Potato Corner trademarks "can be [i]mplied from the nature of the contract and circumstances surrounding it." See Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Emp. Union, Local 16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 725 (1968). The "initial effort of the court, in construing contracts of continuing performance of forebearance which contain no express term of duration, must always be that of implying a term of duration commensurate with the intentions of the parties " *Id.* at 727. Only when "the nature of the contract and the totality of the surrounding circumstances give no suggestion as to any ascertainable term . . . , the obligations under the contract shall be terminable at will by any party upon reasonable notice after such a reasonable time has elapsed." *Id.* Further, it is

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immaterial that SPAVI had full knowledge of the contracts' terms. See Jenni Rivera Enterprises, LLC v. Latin World Entertainment Holdings, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 5th 766, 783 (2019). Nor is SPAVI's belief about the legal significance of facts or belief that the parties' agreements are legally binding or has a different legal effect from what it is judicially held to have. See Little v. Amber Hotel Co., 202 Cal. App. 4th 280, 302 (2011).

iv. Plaintiff's Position Statement: Moreover, and again, as drafted it is impossible to know what the specific contract is that is at issue here. It has never been disclosed, and still undisclosed. Rather than jettison the claim or actually identify the contract, instead, Defendants' solution is to fudge with obtuse language in the jury instructions, designed to confuse everyone, including the jury: "there was a contract between any one of the PCJV Plaintiffs and any one of the Cinco parties." Indeed, the only contract that Cinco has been a party to with any of these Counterclaimants is the Settlement Agreement of the Prior Governance Action. There is no other written agreement between PCJV and Cinco, or between any other Counterclaimant and Cinco. It is possible that Counterclaimants are seeking to allege that Cinco is an alter ego of Potato Corner International or others, however, PCJV and the other counterclaimants already alleged this -alt3er ego status of Cinco -- and after a negotiated settlement, dismissed this claim with prejudice. They may not raise it now. See, e.g., Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Ct., 216 Cal. App. 3d 813, 820 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that ""a

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dismissal with prejudice is the maiden name for a common law retraxit," and "[a] retraxit is equivalent to a judgment on the merits and as such bars further litigation on the same subject matter between the parties."); Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal. App. 2d 613, 620—21 (1959) ("The effect of a dismissal with prejudice is quite different, however, when it is executed and filed in return for a consideration moving from the defendant. Such a dismissal operates as a complete bar to any future action and has the same legal effect as a common law petraxit."). Second, as for SPAVI, it purchased intellectual property, and did not assume any contracts binding Cinco. Thus, the claim that SPAVI is bound to good faith and fair dealing as a "successor in interest has no basis" and can be resolved a matter of law,, given that this simply requires interpretation of contracts binding Cinco (of which there are no one) to which SPAVI assumed (also, null set). Put simply $-S\{PAVI \text{ is not a successor in interest to any}\}$ contract of Cinco, and by purchasing the intellectual property of Cinco, it was only bound to those contracts involving the use and licensing of the brand – none of which are at issue in this case.

v. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence:</u> the following categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018),

- Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), and Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance.
- vi. SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence: Each of the agreements included in the trial exhibits and testimony of Mr. Magsaysay, Mr. Koren, and Ms. Victor all of which will establish that none of the Counterclaimants PCJV, PCIT, LA Group LLC, GK Capital, NKM, or Koren have any contract to which Cinco has privity; the settlement agreement (Trial Exhibit 1172) and evidence of the dismissals with prejudice, as well as the pleadings in the prior case establishing what has been dismissed, and subject to retraxit.
- f. Element No. 2: The Counterclaimant that is a party to the contract did all or substantially all of the things required under the contract, or were excused from so performing:
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 2: The parties dispute this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual and legal.
 - iii. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement:</u> Plaintiff's position statement does not address a legal issue concerning this element. To the extent Plaintiff's position statement addresses element 1, PCJV USA Parties incorporate their respective response here.
 - iv. <u>Plaintiff's Position Statement:</u> as drafted it is impossible to know what the specific contract is at issue here. It has never been disclosed, and still undisclosed. So, when this element in the instructions says, "the contract," whereas the prior

element refers to some unidentified contract, as a matter of law, yes, this element is disputed. To the extent any actual contract ever existed between Cinco and these parties, the only one that is possible is the Settlement Agreement and corresponding agreement selling PCJV equity to GKK Capital. (Trial Exhibit 1176.) Because Cinco has never been a party to any other contract with any of the Counterclaim Defendants, that is the only one that could possibly be at issue, but Defendants refuse to acknowledge this. It is possible that Counterclaimants are seeking to allege that Cinco is an alter ego of Potato Corner International or others, however, PCJV and the other counterclaimants already alleged this -- alter ego status of Cinco -- and after a negotiated settlement, dismissed this claim with prejudice. They may not raise it now. See, e.g., Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Ct., 216 Cal. App. 3d 813, 820 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that "a dismissal with prejudice is the maiden name for a common law retraxit," and "[a] retraxit is equivalent to a judgment on the merits and as such bars further litigation on the same subject matter between the parties."); Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal. App. 2d 613, 620—21 (1959) ("The effect of a dismissal with prejudice is quite different, however, when it is executed and filed in return for a consideration moving from the defendant. Such a dismissal operates as a complete bar to any future action and has the same legal effect as a common law petraxit."). Second, as for SPAVI, it purchased intellectual property, and did not assume any contracts binding Cinco. Thus, the claim that SPAVI is bound to good

faith and fair dealing as a "successor in interest has no basis" and can be resolved a matter of law,, given that this simply requires interpretation of contracts binding Cinco (of which there are no one) to which SPAVI assumed (also, null set). Put simply – S{PAVI is not a successor in interest to any contract of Cinco, and by purchasing the intellectual property of Cinco, it was only bound to those contracts involving the use and licensing of the brand – none of which are at issue in this case.

- v. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: the following categories, which are defined above, capture the key phases and supporting evidence: Superseding Joint Venture (2008–2010), Alternative Licensing Arrangements and Ongoing Ratification (2011–2012), Formalization and Modification of the Joint Venture (2012), LA Group Partnership Agreement and Evolving Business Dynamics and Terms (2013–2018), Dispute, Litigation, and State Court Proceedings (2018 and Beyond), Ongoing Annual Ratification and Regulatory Compliance, and SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct.
- vi. SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence: Each of the agreements included in the trial exhibits and testimony of Mr. Magsaysay, Mr. Koren, and Ms. Victor all of which will establish that none of the Counterclaimants PCJV, PCIT, LA Group LLC, GK Capital, NKM, or Koren have any contract to which Cinco has privity; the settlement agreement (Trial Exhibit 1172) and evidence of the dismissals with prejudice, as well as the pleadings in the prior case establishing what has been dismissed, and subject

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to retraxit.

- g. <u>Element No. 3:</u> Cinco or SPAVI engaged in conduct that breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 3: The parties dispute this element is satisfied.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual and legal.
 - iii. PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement: Plaintiff's position statement does not address a legal issue concerning this element. To the extent Plaintiff's position statement addresses element 1, PCJV USA Parties incorporate their respective response here.
 - Plaintiff's Position Statement: The only contracts that have iv. been identified as being "breached" are the unsigned licensee agreement and the AJVA. Neither document binds Cinco – indeed, that the AJVA constitutes an agreement to agree and not a contract has already been adjudicated and decided as law of the case. It is impossible to know what the specific contract is at issue here. To the extent any actual contract ever existed between Cinco and these parties, the only one that is possible is the Settlement Agreement and corresponding agreement selling PCJV equity to GKK Capital. (Trial Exhibit 1176.) Because Cinco has never been a party to any other contract with any of the Counterclaim Defendants, that is the only one that could possibly be at issue, but Defendants refuse to acknowledge this. In the absence of a contract binding Cinco, it is possible that Counterclaimants are seeking to allege that Cinco is an alter ego of Potato Corner International or others, however,

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PCJV and the other counterclaimants already alleged this -alter ego status of Cinco -- and after a negotiated settlement, dismissed this claim with prejudice. They may not raise it now. See, e.g., Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Ct., 216 Cal. App. 3d 813, 820 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that ""a dismissal with prejudice is the maiden name for a common law retraxit," and "[a] retraxit is equivalent to a judgment on the merits and as such bars further litigation on the same subject matter between the parties."); Datta v. Staab, 173 Cal. App. 2d 613, 620—21 (1959) ("The effect of a dismissal with prejudice is quite different, however, when it is executed and filed in return for a consideration moving from the defendant. Such a dismissal operates as a complete bar to any future action and has the same legal effect as a common law petraxit."). Second, as for SPAVI, it purchased intellectual property, and did not assume any contracts binding Cinco. Thus, the claim that SPAVI is bound to good faith and fair dealing as a "successor in interest has no basis" and can be resolved a matter of law,, given that this simply requires interpretation of contracts binding Cinco (of which there are no one) to which SPAVI assumed (also, null set). Put simply - S{PAVI is not a successor in interest to any contract of Cinco, and by purchasing the intellectual property of Cinco, it was only bound to those contracts involving the use and licensing of the brand– none of which are at issue in this case.

v. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence:</u> the following category, which is defined above, captures the key phase and

supporting evidence: SPAVI Parties' Tortious Conduct. SPAVI Parties' Supporting Evidence: The absence of evidence that Cinco was a party to, or breached, any contract with any of the Counterclaimants is the supporting evidence. Plaintiff's Position Statement: In addition to the absence of any contract binding Cinco or SPAVI – thus there could be no corresponding breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing – the evidence of Koren's behavior during the license negotiations, particularly with SPAVI, lead to the conclusion that it was he that caused the negotiations to fail, not anyone else. Testimony of SPAVI (Gregorio and Tan) as well as their correspondence with Koren (Trial Exhibits 20-31) will establish this. The only contracts that have been identified as being "breached" are the unsigned licensee agreement and the AJVA. Neither document binds Cinco – indeed, that the AJVA constitutes an agreement to agree and not a contract has already been adjudicated and decided as law of the case. It is impossible to know what the specific contract is at issue here. To the extent any actual contract ever existed between Cinco and these parties, the only one that is possible is the Settlement Agreement and corresponding agreement selling PCJV equity to GKK Capital. (Trial Exhibit 1176.) I acknowledge has never been a party to any other contract with any of the Counterclaim Defendants, which is the only one that could possibly be at issue, but Defendants refuse to acknowledge this.

h. Element No. 4: Counterclaimants were harmed.

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i.	Disputed Status of Element 4:	The parties dispute this
	element is satisfied.	

- ii. Nature of Dispute: legal.
- iii. <u>PCJV Usa Parties' Position Statement</u>: Plaintiff's position statement does not address a legal issue concerning this element. To the extent Plaintiff's position statement addresses element 1, PCJV USA Parties incorporate their respective response here.
- Plaintiff's Position Statement: Cinco breached no contract. iv. The only contracts that have been identified as being "breached" are the unsigned licensee agreement and the AJVA. Neither document binds Cinco – indeed, that the AJVA constitutes an agreement to agree and not a contract has already been adjudicated and decided as law of the case. It is impossible to know what the specific contract is at issue here. To the extent any actual contract ever existed between Cinco and these parties, the only one that is possible is the Settlement Agreement and corresponding agreement selling PCJV equity to GKK Capital. (Trial Exhibit 1176.) Because Cinco has never been a party to any other contract with any of the Counterclaim Defendants, that is the only one that could possibly be at issue, but Defendants refuse to acknowledge this.

i. Cause of Action No. 11: Quantum Meruit.

- i. <u>Element No. 1</u>: any of the SPAVI Parties requested, by words or conduct, that any one of the PCJV USA Parties perform services for the benefit of any of the SPAVI Parties.
 - i. Disputed Status of Element 1: The parties dispute that

franchisee agreements and communications. 1 2 iv. SPAVI and Cinco's Supporting Evidence: there is no 3 evidence of this. 4 5 **SPAVI Parties' Affirmative Defenses** III. 1) Affirmative Defense No. 1: Laches (asserted by Counter Defendant and 6 7 Third Party Defendants as to all claims alleged against them) a. Element No. 1: A Delay in asserting a claim. 8 i. This element is disputed 9 ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and Factual 10 iii. Plaintiff's Position Statement: Laches is an affirmative 11 defense. 12 iv. Defendants' Position Statement: Laches is an equitable 13 claim to be tried by the Court. Ultimax Cement Mfg. 14 15 Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 856 F.Supp. 2d 1136, 1151 (2012). 16 17 v. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Both the JVA and AJVA contain an agreement to agree on a Master License 18 Agreement. However, there was never a written license 19 20 agreement executed between Counterclaimants and Cinco. Counterclaimants entered into a negotiation 21 22 process with Cinco, prior to SPAVI's acquisition of the 23 Potato Corner brand and all of the Potato Corner 24 Intellectual Property from Cinco, for the terms of a 25 license to use the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. 26 These negotiations began before SPAVI purchased the 27 rights to the Potato Corner IP. So, Counterclaimants have been aware of the lack of ownership rights in the Potato 28

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Corner Intellectual Property and the non-existence of a written agreement. Then, between December of 2021 through 2024, the months immediately preceding this action, SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to negotiate the terms of a written license with PCJV as well. Never once did Counterclaimants state that they had ownership rights to the Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and SPAVI relied on that representation because had one been expressed, that would have been a dispute as to the ownership rights to which SPAVI would have filed this lawsuit sooner. Additional evidence includes: Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO filings including Registrations and Assignments; Testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising); and emails and correspondence during the negotiation of the terms of the license agreement.

- vi. PCJV USA's Parties Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. See n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action
- b. Element No. 2: acquiescence by Counterclaim Defendants or Third

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Party Defendants or their suffering of prejudice, which can include detrimental reliance on the status quo, loss of evidence, or other circumstances that make it inequitable to allow the claimants to assert their claim after the delay.

- i. This element is disputes
- ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual
- iii. Plaintiff's Position Statement: Laches is an affirmative defense.
- iv. PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement: PCJV USA

 Parties' Position Statement: Laches is an equitable claim
 to be tried by the Court. Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v.

 CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 856 F.Supp. 2d 1136, 1151
 (2012). "A defendant must demonstrate three elements to
 successfully assert laches defense: (1) delay in asserting a
 right or claim; (2) the delay was not reasonable or
 excusable; and (3) prejudice to the party against whom
 laches is asserted." Magic Kitchen LLC v. Good Things
 Internat., Ltd., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 1157 (2007).
 SPAVI Parties' statement of what it needs to prove here
 as an element to laches is incorrect
- v. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Both the JVA and AJVA contain an agreement to agree on a Master License Agreement. However, there was never a written license agreement executed between Counterclaimants and Cinco. Counterclaimants entered into a negotiation process with Cinco, prior to SPAVI's acquisition of the Potato Corner brand and all of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property from Cinco, for the terms of a

license to use the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. These negotiations began in [DATE]. So, as of [DATE], Counterclaimants have been aware of the lack of ownership rights in the Potato Corner Intellectual Property and the non-existence of a written agreement. Then, between December of 2021 through 2024, the months immediately preceding this action, SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to negotiate the terms of a written license with PCJV as well. Never once did Counterclaimants state that they had ownership rights to the Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and SPAVI relied on that representation because had one been expressed, that would have been a dispute as to the ownership rights to which SPAVI would have filed this lawsuit sooner. Additional evidence includes: Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO filings including Registrations and Assignments; Testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising); and emails and correspondence during the negotiation of the terms of the license agreement.

vi. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. See n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate

by reference all	of the	evidence	cited in	support	of their
causes of action.					

- 2) Affirmative Defense No. 2: Consent (asserted by Counterclaim Defendant and Third Party Defendants as to all claims alleged against them)
 - a. Element No. 1: One or more of the Counterclaimants or Third Party Plaintiffs consented to the acts about which they complain.
 - i. This element is disputed.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual
 - iii. Plaintiff's Position Statement: The elements are taken from CACI 1721
 - iv. PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement: SPAVI Parties' appear to have combined an element of their laches affirmative defense. Otherwise, there is no legal support for SPAVI Parties' articulated element
 - v. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Both the JVA and AJVA contain an agreement to agree on a Master License Agreement. However, there was never a written license agreement executed between Counterclaimants and Cinco. Counterclaimants entered into a negotiation process with Cinco, prior to SPAVI's acquisition of the Potato Corner brand and all of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property from Cinco, for the terms of a license to use the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. These negotiations began in [DATE]. So, as of [DATE], Counterclaimants have been aware of the lack of ownership rights in the Potato Corner Intellectual Property and the non-existence of a written agreement.

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Then, between December of 2021 through 2024, the months immediately preceding this action, SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to negotiate the terms of a written license with PCJV as well. Never once did Counterclaimants state that they had ownership rights to the Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and SPAVI relied on that representation because had one been expressed, that would have been a dispute as to the ownership rights to which SPAVI would have filed this lawsuit sooner. Additional evidence includes: Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO filings including Registrations and Assignments; Testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising); and emails and correspondence during the negotiation of the terms of the license agreement.

- vi. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. See n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action.
- 3) Affirmative Defense No. 3: Estoppel (asserted by Counterclaim Defendant and Third Party Defendants as to all claims alleged against them)

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- a. Element No. 1: A representation or concealment of material facts;
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual
 - iii. SPAVI and Cinco's Position Statement: Estoppel is an affirmative defense
 - iv. PCJV USA Parties Position: PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement: Equitable estoppel is an equitable claim to be tried by the Court. Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 856 F.Supp. 2d 1136, 1151 (2012).
 - v. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Counterclaimants have no evidence of a written license to use SPAVI's Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and, as such, its rights (that it has sold to its franchisees) derive from what is, at best, a terminable at will, fully revocable license because Defendants were nonetheless operating Potato Corner locations, as if a written license existed. See Pogrebnoy v. Russian Newspaper Distribution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd, 742 F. App'x 291 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[A]n implied license, like any other contract, is terminable at the will of either party if it is not for a specified term."). After SPAVI's acquisition of the Potato Corner brand, it became the licensor of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. Between December of 2021 through 2024, the months immediately preceding this action, SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to negotiate the terms of a written license with PCJV. Defendant Guy Koren engaged and participated in this negotiation, but was unwilling to agree to any minimally

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commercially viable licensing terms. Never once did
Counterclaimants state that they had ownership rights to
the Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and SPAVI relied
on that representation. Additional evidence includes:
Testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay
(Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General
Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international
franchising); and emails and correspondence during the
negotiation of the terms of the license agreement.

- vi. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers. As it is articulated there, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action.
- b. Element 2: Made with knowledge, actual or virtual, of the facts;
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual
 - iii. <u>Plaintiff's Position Statement:</u> Estoppel is an affirmative defense
 - iv. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement:</u> Equitable estoppel is an equitable claim to be tried by the Court. *Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp.*, 856 F.Supp. 2d 1136, 1151 (2012).
 - v. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Plaintiff's Supporting
 Evidence: Counterclaimants have no evidence of a written
 license to use SPAVI's Potato Corner Intellectual

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Property, and, as such, its rights (that it has sold to its franchisees) derive from what is, at best, a terminable at will, fully revocable license because Defendants were nonetheless operating Potato Corner locations, as if a written license existed. See Pogrebnoy v. Russian Newspaper Distribution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd, 742 F. App'x 291 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[A]n implied license, like any other contract, is terminable at the will of either party if it is not for a specified term."). After SPAVI's acquisition of the Potato Corner brand, it became the licensor of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. Between December of 2021 through 2024, the months immediately preceding this action, SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to negotiate the terms of a written license with PCJV. Defendant Guy Koren engaged and participated in this negotiation, but was unwilling to agree to any minimally commercially viable licensing terms. Never once did Counterclaimants state that they had ownership rights to the Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and SPAVI relied on that representation. Additional evidence includes: Testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising); and emails and correspondence during the

vi. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included

negotiation of the terms of the license agreement

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in their Answers. As it is articulated there, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action

- c. <u>Element 3:</u> To a party ignorant, actually, and permissibly, of the truth;
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: legal and factual
 - iii. <u>Plaintiff's position statement:</u> Estoppel is an affirmative defense
 - iv. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement:</u> Equitable estoppel is an equitable claim to be tried by the Court. *Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp.*, 856 F.Supp. 2d 1136, 1151 (2012).
 - v. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Counterclaimants have no evidence of a written license to use SPAVI's Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and, as such, its rights (that it has sold to its franchisees) derive from what is, at best, a terminable at will, fully revocable license because Defendants were nonetheless operating Potato Corner locations, as if a written license existed. See Pogrebnoy v. Russian Newspaper Distribution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd, 742 F. App'x 291 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[A]n implied license, like any other contract, is terminable at the will of either party if it is not for a specified term."). After SPAVI's acquisition of the Potato

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1	Corner brand, it became the licensor of the Potato Corner
2	Intellectual Property. Between December of 2021 through
3	2024, the months immediately preceding this action,
4	SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to
5	negotiate the terms of a written license with PCJV.
6	Defendant Guy Koren engaged and participated in this
7	negotiation, but was unwilling to agree to any minimally
8	commercially viable licensing terms. Never once did
9	Counterclaimants state that they had ownership rights to
10	the Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and SPAVI relied
11	on that representation. Instead, Counterclaimant engaged
12	in the negotiation process. Additional evidence includes:
13	Testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay
14	(Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General
15	Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international
16	franchising); and emails and correspondence during the
17	negotiation of the terms of the license agreement
18	vi. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties
19	have not articulated their defense beyond what is included
20	in their Answers. As it is articulated there, PCJV Parties
21	cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As
22	such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties
23	incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in
24	support of their causes of action
25	d. Element 4: With the intention, actual or virtual, that the ignorant
26	party act on it; and
27	i. This element is disputed
28	ii. Nature of Dispute: legal and factual

1	iii.	<u>Plaintiff's position statement:</u> Estoppel is an affirmative
2		defense
3	iv.	PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement: Equitable
4		estoppel is an equitable claim to be tried by the Court.
5		Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp.,
6		856 F.Supp. 2d 1136, 1151 (2012).
7	V.	Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Never once did
8		Counterclaimants state that they had ownership rights to
9		the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. Instead,
10		Defendant Guy Koren engaged and participated in the
11		negotiation of the license to use the Potato Corner
12		Intellectual Property, with the intent of having SPAVI
13		relied on that representation that Counterclaimant did not
14		have a license. Additional evidence includes: Testimony
15		of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO),
16		Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), Tan
17		(Director responsible for international franchising); and
18		emails and correspondence during the negotiation of the
19		terms of the license agreement
20	vi.	PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties
21		have not articulated their defense beyond what is included
22		in their Answers. As it is articulated there, PCJV Parties
23		cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As
24		such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties
25		incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in
26		support of their causes of action.
27	e. Element	5: That party was induced to act on it and was harmed.
28	i.	This element is disputed

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- ii. Nature of Dispute: legal and factual
- iii. <u>Plaintiff's position statement:</u> Estoppel is an affirmative defense
- iv. <u>PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement:</u> Equitable estoppel is an equitable claim to be tried by the Court. *Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp.*, 856 F.Supp. 2d 1136, 1151 (2012).
- v. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Never once did Counterclaimants state that they had ownership rights to the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. Instead, Defendant Guy Koren engaged and participated in the negotiation of the license to use the Potato Corner Intellectual Property, with the intent of having SPAVI relied on that representation that Counterclaimant did not have a license. Guy Koren refused to, engage in reasonable and good faith negotiation. Instead, he only offered royalty rates and license fees that were more than 90% below what Koren had agreed to be reasonable licensing fees over a decade prior. Koren also repeatedly disengaged from the negotiation process, but still was utilizing the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. In the three months prior to the termination of the licensing agreement, Koren had gone radio silent, leading SPAVI to believe that it no longer was interested in negotiating a license. Therefore, SPAVI had no option, but to terminate Counterclaimants license of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. Additional evidence includes: Testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO),

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Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising); and emails and correspondence during the negotiation of the terms of the license agreement

- vi. PCJV USA Parties' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers. As it is articulated there, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action.
- 4) <u>Affirmative Defense No. 4</u> Failure to Mitigate Damages (asserted by Counterclaim Defendant and Third Party Defendants as to all claims alleged against them)
 - a. Element No. 1: That the party seeking the damage award failed to use reasonable efforts to mitigate damages
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual
 - iii. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Both the JVA and AJVA contain an agreement to agree on a Master License Agreement. There was never a written license agreement between Counterclaimants and counter defendants or third party defendants for the use of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. Counterclaimants entered into a negotiation process with Cinco, prior to SPAVI's acquisition of the Potato Corner brand and all of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property from Cinco, for the terms of a license to use the Potato Corner Intellectual

Property. These negotiations began before SPAVI purchased the rights to the Potato Corner IP. So, Counterclaimants have been aware of the lack of ownership rights in the Potato Corner Intellectual Property and the non-existence of a written agreement. Then, between December of 2021 through 2024, the months immediately preceding the filing of this action, SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to negotiate the terms of a written license with Counterclaimants as well. Never once did Counterclaimants state that they had ownership rights to the Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and SPAVI relied on that representation because had one been expressed, that would have been a dispute as to the ownership rights to which SPAVI would have filed this lawsuit sooner. Moreover, Guy Koren refused to engage in reasonable and good faith negotiation, which would have led to the execution of a licensing agreement. Instead, he only offered royalty rates and license fees that were more than 90% below what Koren had agreed to be reasonable licensing fees over a decade prior. Koren also repeatedly disengaged from the negotiation process, but still was utilizing the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. In the three months prior to the termination of the licensing agreement, Koren had gone radio silent, leading SPAVI to believe that it no longer was interested in negotiating a license. Therefore, SPAVI had no option, but to terminate Counterclaimants license to use the Potato Corner

Intellectual Property. Additional evidence includes:
Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO
filings including Registrations and Assignments;
Testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay
(Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General
Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international
franchising); May 31, 2024 Termination Letter; and
emails and correspondence during the negotiation of the
terms of the license agreement.

- iv. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. See n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action
- b. Element No. 2: the amount, if any, by which damages have been mitigated
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual
 - iii. <u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Had Counterclaimants negotiated in good faith, SPAVI would have executed a license agreement and not terminated the licensing agreement. The amount of alleged damage resulting from the termination of the license agreement could have been mitigated. Additional evidence includes: Amended Joint Venture Agreement and Joint Venture Agreement;

Testimony of Koren, Plaintiff executives Gregorio
(Plaiuntiff's CEO), Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO charged
with US operations), Tan (Director responsible for
international franchising); Emails and correspondence
with SPAVI, Koren, and PCJV relating to negotiations of
a licensing agreement for the use of the Potato Corner
Intellectual Property; Financial documents of
Counterclaimants; May 31, 2024 Termination Letter

- iv. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. See n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action
- 5) Affirmative Defense No. 5: Immunity (asserted by SPAVI as to all claims alleged against it)
 - a. Element No. 1 That Counterclaim Defendant had a legitimate economic interest and thus shielded from liability in pursuit of its own lawful business interests
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: Legal and factual
 - iii. PCJV USA Parties' Position Statement: PCJV USA Parties cannot articulate a response to this affirmative defense because SPAVI Parties did not provide their statement of what the applicable elements are or their positions regarding those elements. They have otherwise

ii. Nature of Dispute: legal and factual

- iii. <u>Defendants' Position Statement:</u> SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers. *See* n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the legal basis for the defense
- iv. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: In December 2021,
 SPAVI entered into a transaction to acquire the Potato
 Corner Intellectual Property, including the Potato Corner
 Standard Characters Mark and the Potato Corner Logo
 Mark, and all of the rights thereto, from Cinco. That
 transaction closed during the first half of 2022. As such,
 SPAVI had an economic interest in the Potato Corner
 Intellectual Property. Additional evidence includes:
 Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO
 filings including Registrations and Assignments,
 testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay
 (Cinco's CEO), Tan (Director responsible for
 international franchising)
- v. <u>Defendants' Supporting Evidence:</u> SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. *See* n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action
- b. <u>Element No. 2</u> That Counterclaim Defendant acted only to protect its own economic interest.

- i. This element is disputed
- ii. Nature of Dispute: legal and factual
- iii. Defendants' Position Statement: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers. *See* n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the legal basis for the defense.
- iv. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Counterclaimant have no evidence of a written license to use SPAVI's Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and, as such, its rights (that it has sold to its franchisees) derive from what is, at best, a terminable at will, fully revocable license because Defendants were nonetheless operating Potato Corner locations, as if a written license existed. See Pogrebnoy v. Russian Newspaper Distribution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd, 742 F. App'x 291 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[A]n implied license, like any other contract, is terminable at the will of either party if it is not for a specified term."). After SPAVI's acquisition of the Potato Corner brand, it became the licensor of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. Between December of 2021 through 2024, the months immediately preceding this action, SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to negotiate the terms of a written license with PCJV. Defendant Guy Koren engaged and participated in this negotiation, but was unwilling to agree to any minimally commercially viable licensing terms. Therefore, Plaintiff had no option to terminate the license of the Potato

Corner Intellectual Property. Additional evidence includes: Testimony of Koren, Plaintiff executives Gregorio (Plaiuntiff's CEO), Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO charged with US operations), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO); Emails and correspondence with SPAVI, Koren, and PCJV relating to negotiations of a licensing agreement for the use of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property; Amended Joint Venture Agreement; Franchise Agreements; FDDs; Trial Exhibit 29 (May 31, 2024 Termination)

- v. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. *See* n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action.
- c. <u>Element No. 3</u> That Counterclaim Defendant acted reasonably and in good faith to protect it.
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: legal and factual
 - iii. Defendants' Position Statement: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers. *See* n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the legal basis for the defense.

1	iv.	<u>Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence:</u> Counterclaimant have no
2		evidence of a written license to use SPAVI's Potato
3		Corner Intellectual Property, and, as such, its rights (that
4		it has sold to its franchisees) derive from what is, at best,
5		a terminable at will, fully revocable license because
6		Defendants were nonetheless operating Potato Corner
7		locations, as if a written license existed. See Pogrebnoy v.
8		Russian Newspaper Distribution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d
9		1061, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd, 742 F. App'x 291 (9th
10		Cir. 2018) ("[A]n implied license, like any other contract,
11		is terminable at the will of either party if it is not for a
12		specified term."). After SPAVI's acquisition of the Potato
13		Corner brand, it became the licensor of the Potato Corner
14		Intellectual Property. Between December of 2021 through
15		2024, the months immediately preceding this action,
16		SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to
17		negotiate the terms of a written license with PCJV.
18		Defendant Guy Koren engaged and participated in this
19		negotiation, but was unwilling to agree to any minimally
20		commercially viable licensing terms. Therefore, Plaintiff
21		had no option to terminate the license of the Potato
22		Corner Intellectual Property. Additional evidence
23		includes: Testimony of Koren, Plaintiff executives
24		Gregorio (Plaiuntiff's CEO), Concepcion (Plaintiff's
25		COO charged with US operations), Tan (Director
26		responsible for international franchising), Magsaysay
27		(Cinco's CEO); Emails and correspondence with SPAVI,
28		Koren, and PCJV relating to negotiations of a licensing

- agreement for the use of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property; Amended Joint Venture Agreement; Franchise Agreements; FDDs; Trial Exhibit 29 (May 31, 2024) Termination)
- v. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. See n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action.
- 7) Affirmative Defense No. 7: Unclean Hands (asserted by Counterclaim Defendant and Third Party Defendants as to all claims alleged against them)
 - a. Element No. 1: Counterclaimant engaged in inequitable and/or unethical behavior that bars it from seeking relief
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual
 - iii. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Counterclaimants have at best, a terminable at will, fully revocable license because Defendants were nonetheless operating Potato Corner locations, as if a written license existed. See Pogrebnoy v. Russian Newspaper Distribution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd, 742 F. App'x 291 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[A]n implied license, like any other contract, is terminable at the will of either party if it is not for a specified term."). Despite using the Potato Corner

Intellectual Property for over a decade, Counterclaimants 1 2 have never once paid a single cent of a licensing for its 3 use to Cinco nor SPAVI. Counterclaimants have used 4 Cinco's, and after the asset purchase, SPAVI's trademark 5 without compensation to either party. Additional evidence 6 includes: Financial statements of Counterclaimants 7 evidence that no licensing fees have ever been paid; Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO 8 9 filings including Registrations and Assignments; Testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay 10 (Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General 11 Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international 12 franchising), Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO charged with 13 14 US operations); emails and correspondence with Cinco, 15 SPAVI, Koren, and PCJV relating to negotiations of a licensing agreement 16 iv. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have 17 not articulated their defense beyond what is included in 18 19 their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. See n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot 20 21 determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the 22 out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate 23 by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their 24 causes of action. Also, the state court preliminary 25 injunction (holding that Cinco Corporation was not likely 26 to prevail on prior claims of wrongdoing); confidential 27 settlement communications do not support allegations; 28 Cinco Corporation's settlement and release of prior

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allegations of wrongdoing.

- 8) Affirmative Defense No. 8: Waiver (asserted by Counterclaim Defendant and Third Party Defendants as to all claims alleged against them)
 - a. Element No. 1: Through implied and/or express conduct, Counterclaimants knowingly waived a valid right, privilege, advantage, or benefit allegedly conferred upon it and its attempt to enforce that right, privilege, advantage, or benefit is thus barred.
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual
 - vii. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Both the JVA and AJVA contain an agreement to agree on a Master License Agreement. There was never a written license agreement between Counterclaimants and counter defendants or third party defendants. Counterclaimant entered into a negotiation process with Cinco, prior to SPAVI's acquisition of the Potato Corner brand and all of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property from Cinco, for the terms of a license to use the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. These negotiations began before SPAVI purchased the rights to the Potato Corner IP. So, Counterclaimants have been aware of the lack of ownership rights in the Potato Corner Intellectual Property and the non-existence of a written agreement. Then, between December of 2021 through 2024, the months immediately preceding the filing of this action, SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to negotiate the terms of a written license with Counterclaimants as well. Never once did

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Counterclaimants state that they had ownership rights to the Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and SPAVI relied on that representation because had one been expressed, that would have been a dispute as to the ownership rights to which SPAVI would have filed this lawsuit sooner. Instead, Counterclaimants and Counter Defendants continued to negotiate the terms of a license to use the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. Additional evidence includes: Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO filings including Registrations and Assignments; Testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising); and emails and correspondence during the negotiation of the terms of the license agreement.

iii. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. See n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action. The state court preliminary injunction (enjoining Cinco Corporation from interfering with PCJV's President's control over Potato Corner in the United States and communicating with its franchisees); confidential settlement communications do not support any waiver, as Defendants never waived any rights but

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were trying to settle disputes; Cinco Corporation's settlement and release of prior allegations and transfer of the very interests, rights and obligations over which the parties are now litigating.

- 9) <u>Affirmative Defense No. 9:</u> Comparative Fault (asserted by Counterclaim Defendant SPAVI as to the negligent interference with prospective economic relations claim)
 - a. Element No. 1: That Counterclaimant was negligent
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual
 - iii. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Both the JVA and AJVA contain an agreement to agree on a Master License Agreement. As such, there was no written license agreement. Counterclaimant entered into a negotiation process with Cinco, prior to SPAVI's acquisition of the Potato Corner brand and all of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property from Cinco, for the terms of a license to use the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. These negotiations began before SPAVI purchased the rights to the Potato Corner IP. So, Counterclaimants have been aware of the lack of ownership rights in the Potato Corner Intellectual Property and the non-existence of a written agreement. Then, between December of 2021 through 2024, the months immediately preceding this action, SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to negotiate the terms of a written license with PCJV as well. Never once did Counterclaimants state that they had ownership rights to the Potato Corner

Intellectual Property, and SPAVI relied on that representation because had one been expressed, that would have been a dispute as to the ownership rights to which SPAVI would have filed this lawsuit sooner. Moreover, Guy Koren could have, but refused to, engage in reasonable and good faith negotiation. Instead, he only offered royalty rates and license fees that were more than 90% below what Koren had agreed to be reasonable licensing fees over a decade prior. Koren also repeatedly disengaged from the negotiation process, but still was utilizing the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. Additional evidence includes: Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO filings including Registrations and Assignments; Testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising); and emails and correspondence during the negotiation of the terms of the license agreement.

iv. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. See n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action. The state court preliminary injunction (enjoining Cinco Corporation from interfering with

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PCJV's President's control over Potato Corner in the United States and communicating with its franchisees); at all relevant times Defendants exercised control over Potato Corner in the United States and did not change the status quo between the parties, including in dealings with Plaintiff and Plaintiff's predecessor.

- b. <u>Element No. 2</u>: That Counterclaimant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing its harm.
 - i. This element is disputed
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual
 - iii. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Guy Koren could have, but refused to, engage in reasonable and good faith negotiation. Instead, he only offered royalty rates and license fees that were more than 90% below what Koren had agreed to be reasonable licensing fees over a decade prior. Koren also repeatedly disengaged from the negotiation process, but still was utilizing the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. In light of the two year negotiation process that went nowhere, and Counterclaimant no furnishing any consideration whatsoever in exchange for the use of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property, SPAVI concluded that it exhausted all efforts to negotiate a license agreement with Counterclaimants. As such, SPAVI had no choice by to terminate Counterclaimants licensing agreement. Additional supporting evidence includes: Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO filings including Registrations and Assignments; Testimony of

Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising); May 31, 2024 Termination Letter; and emails and correspondence during the negotiation of the terms of the license agreement.

- iv. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. See n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action. The state court preliminary injunction (enjoining Cinco Corporation from interfering with PCJV's President's control over Potato Corner in the United States and communicating with its franchisees); at all relevant times Defendants exercised control over Potato Corner in the United States and did not change the status quo between the parties, including in dealings with Plaintiff and Plaintiff's predecessor
- 10) <u>Affirmative Defense No. 10:</u> Lack or Inadequacy of Consideration (asserted by Counterclaim Defendant and Third Party Defendants as to all claims alleged against them)
 - a. <u>Element No. 1:</u> Counterclaimant has failed or refused to provide anything of value in exchange for the use of SPAVI's license to use the Potato Corner Intellectual Property
 - i. This element is disputed

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- ii. Nature of Dispute: factual
- iii. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Despite using the Potato Corner Intellectual Property for over a decade, Counterclaimants have never once paid a single cent of a licensing fee for its use to Cinco nor SPAVI. Counterclaimants have used Cinco's, and after the asset purchase, SPAVI's trademark without compensation to either party. Additional evidence includes: Financial statements of Counterclaimants evidence that no licensing fees have ever been paid; Notarized Deeds signed by seller and buyer; USPTO filings including Registrations and Assignments; Testimony of Gregorio (Plaintiff's CEO), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO), Koren, Ybanez (Plaintiff's General Counsel), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising), Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO charged with US operations); JVA and AJVA; emails and correspondence with Cinco, SPAVI, Koren, and PCJV relating to negotiations of a licensing agreement
- iv. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. See n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action
- 11) Affirmative Defense No. 11: Abandonment or Mutual Recession of

Contract (asserted by Counterclaim Defendant and Third Party Defendants as to all claims alleged against them)

- a. <u>Element No. 1</u>: Counterclaimants license to use the Potato Corner Intellectual Property was effectively terminated by mutual consent or that Counterclaimants actions led SPAVI to believe that it was abandoned.
 - i. This element is disputed.
 - ii. Nature of Dispute: factual
 - iii. Plaintiff's Supporting Evidence: Counterclaimants have no evidence of a written license to use SPAVI's Potato Corner Intellectual Property, and, as such, its rights (that it has sold to its franchisees) derive from what is, at best, a terminable at will, fully revocable license because Defendants were nonetheless operating Potato Corner locations, as if a written license existed. See Pogrebnoy v. Russian Newspaper Distribution, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd, 742 F. App'x 291 (9th Cir. 2018) ("[A]n implied license, like any other contract, is terminable at the will of either party if it is not for a specified term."). After SPAVI's acquisition of the Potato Corner brand, it became the licensor of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. Between December of 2021 through 2024, the months immediately preceding this action, SPAVI engaged in a good faith and exhaustive attempt to negotiate the terms of a written license with PCJV. Defendant Guy Koren engaged and participated in this negotiation, but was unwilling to agree to any minimally commercially viable licensing terms. Moreover, Guy

Koren refused to, engage in reasonable and good faith negotiation. Instead, he only offered royalty rates and license fees that were more than 90% below what Koren had agreed to be reasonable licensing fees over a decade prior. Koren also repeatedly disengaged from the negotiation process, but still was utilizing the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. In the three months prior to the termination of the licensing agreement, Koren had gone radio silent, leading SPAVI to believe that it no longer was interested in negotiating a license. Therefore, SPAVI had no option, but to terminate Coutnerclaimants license of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property. Additional evidence includes: Testimony of Koren, Plaintiff executives Gregorio (Plaiuntiff's CEO), Concepcion (Plaintiff's COO charged with US operations), Tan (Director responsible for international franchising), Magsaysay (Cinco's CEO); Emails and correspondence with SPAVI, Koren, and PCJV relating to negotiations of a licensing agreement for the use of the Potato Corner Intellectual Property; Amended Joint Venture Agreement; Franchise Agreements; FDDs; Trial Exhibit 29 (May 31, 2024 Termination) iv. Defendants' Supporting Evidence: SPAVI parties have

not articulated their defense beyond what is included in their Answers until 7am on August 12, 2025. See n. 1. As it is articulated in the Answers, PCJV Parties cannot determine the factual basis for the defense. As such, the out of an abundance of caution, PCJV Parties incorporate

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by reference all of the evidence cited in support of their causes of action. Defendants settled with Plaintiff's predecessor and acquired all of Plaintiff's predecessor's interests in PCJV and all "attached" rights; it did not abandon any rights or obligations under PCJV USA, LLC's governing documents.

Adjudication of Causes of Action, Counter Claims, Third Party Claims, IV. and Affirmative Defenses Not to be Decided by a Jury

The parties request adjudication of the following causes of action, counter claims, third party claims, and affirmative defenses in the following manner and at the following time:

- 1) At the conclusion of trial, Plaintiff will seek a permanent injunction and declaratory relief with this Court, as well as for additional relief under the Lanham Act reserved for this Court. At that time, depending on the jury's reaction to the § 1125 unfair competition claim, Plaintiff will present that equitable claim to this Court. Plaintiff will also present at that time its affirmative defense of "One Who Seeks Equity Must Do Equity."
- 2) PCJV USA Parties request the Court to adjudicate PCJV USA Parties' following causes of action at the conclusion of trial: (1) Declaratory Relief; and (2) Violations of Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq
- 3) PCJV USA Parties request the Court to adjudicate PCJV USA Parties' following affirmative defenses at the conclusion of trial: (1) failure to state a claim; (2) consent/acquiescence, ratification, promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, and judicial estoppel; (3) unclean hands; (4) laches, (5) fraud on USPTO, (6) authorized use, (7) public availability of trade secrets, and (8) lack of at will license agreement

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that, on August 12, 2025, the foregoing document was electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court, Central District of California, using the Court's ECF filing system. I further certify that all counsel for all parties to this action are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

10 Dated: August 12, 2025

FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP

/s Michael Murphy
Michael D. Murphy

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant SHAKEY'S PIZZA ASIA VENTURES, INC. and Third Party Defendants CINCO CORPORATION, PC INTERNATIONAL PTE LTD., and SPAVI INTERNATIONAL USA, INC.